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I. INTRODUCTION
Lon Fuller's jurisprudence1 significantly influenced the structure
and format of the 1969 American Bar Association's Model Code of
Professional Responsibility. The Model Code's three-part structure of
Disciplinary Rules, Ethical Considerations, and Canons followed
Fuller's ideas on the morality of law. The structure also suggested a
connection to Fuller's ideas on the purposive nature of law and legal
interpretation.
The Model Code reflected the peak of Fuller's influence in post-
World War II American jurisprudence. Fuller's influence disappeared
during the drafting and in the adoption of the 1983 American Bar
Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The Model
Rules abandoned the Code's structure and format in favor of a re-
statement-like model of black letter rules and accompanying commen-
tary. The Model Rules represented the victory of a new
jurisprudential orthodoxy2 over Lon Fuller's jurisprudence, reflecting
1. Fuller produced a large body of work on a wide variety of topics. For an overview
of his thought, see ROBERT S. SUMMERS, LON L. FULLER, JURISTS: PROFILES IN LEGAL
THEORY (William Twining ed., 1984) [hereinafter PROFILES]. For a collection of Fuller's
work organized around the outline of the book that Fuller intended to write, see LON L.
FULLER, THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER (Kenneth Winston ed., 1981) [hereinafter
SOCIAL ORDER]. Both of these works contain complete bibliographies. The Winston work
also includes some of Fuller's unpublished manuscripts. See also Special Issue on Lon
Fuller, 13 LAW & PHIL. 253 (1994) (six articles discussing different aspects of Fuller's
jurisprudence).
2. Robert Summers described this combined jurisprudence as "pragmatic instrumen-
talism." Robert S. Summers, Professor Fuller's Jurisprudence and America's Dominant
Philosophy of Law, 92 HARV. L. REV. 433, 433 (1978). I adopt Summer's claim that
Fuller's jurisprudence has been eclipsed by pragmatic instrumentalism.
I use this term, like Summers, to refer to that blend of realism and positivism that
comprises contemporary American jurisprudence. Id. at 436. In my usage, it is the
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the rise and fall of normative jurisprudence following World War II
and its replacement as the dominant orthodoxy by 1980.
A. Jurisprudence as the Framework of Lawyer Codes
Jurisprudence is a paradigm-a coherent model or framework
that establishes fundamental beliefs and permissible avenues of en-
quiry.3 Jurisprudence constitutes the way lawyers understand them-
selves and their work. Lawyers are steeped in jurisprudence in law
school and in the practice of law. The subjects they studied and the
ways in which law schools are organized reflect the jurisprudential as-
sumptions of the profession.' Lawyers, perhaps more than other pro-
fessionals, are creatures of their philosophies.5 In this way,
jurisprudence is unavoidable. Merely because one is not con-
cerned directly with it does not make it go away. One may not
think about breathing, but one breathes anyway. One may not
deliberate about the economic system of a country, but one
nonetheless fulfills some role in it. One's jurisprudence, how-
ever unsophisticated or subliminal, is nonetheless played out in
one's conduct at law.6
Alasdair Maclntyre described this process in relation to the his-
tory of moral enquiry. Maclntyre pointed out that "[w]hat are taken
to be the relevant data and how they are identified, characterized, and
classified will depend upon who is performing these tasks and what his
equivalent of the "ordinary religion" described by Roger Cramton at about the same time.
Roger C. Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 247 (1978). Cramton, unlike Summers, does not specifically relate the new jurispru-
dential orthodoxy to the eclipse of Fuller's thought.
3. Cf. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 10-15 (2nd
ed. 1970) (shared paradigms commit scientists to rules and standards that define legitimate
problems and dictate further inquiry).
4. See Maureen Cain, The Symbol Traders, in LAWYERS IN A POSTMODERN WORLD:
TRANSLATION AND TRANSGRESSION 23 (Maureen Cain & Christine B. Harrington eds.,
1994) (explaining that occupational self image requires subscription to codes of conduct
which have little influence on the actual practice of lawyers). Cf Richard A. Posner, The
Material Basis of Jurisprudence, 69 IND. L.J. 1, 3 (1993) ("[P]rofessional ideology is the
result not of a scientific-like search for truth but of the way in which the members of the
profession work, the form and content of their careers, the activities that constitute their
daily rounds, in short the economic and social structure of the profession.").
5. Eugene V. Rostow, American Legal Realism and the Sense of the Profession, 34
ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 123, 125 (1961) (explaining the view that ideas especially influence
law and lawyers because of the persistent pursuit of principle).
6. Douglas Sturm, American Legal Realism and the Covenantal Myth: World Views
in the Practice of Law, 31 MERCER L. REV. 487,488 (1980). Judge Posner suggests that the
lawyer's world view is constituted by the cartel-like conception that, until recently, lawyers
enjoyed complete dominance over legal ethics and philosophy. Posner, supra note 4, at
1-2.
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or her theological and moral standpoint and perspective is."' 7 This is
clarified when thinkers attempt to create a systematic approach to the
problems of their discipline.' The answers are both generated and
constrained by the standards and practices of the particular moral tra-
dition: "There is no standing ground, no place for enquiry, no way to
engage in the practices of advancing, evaluating, accepting, and re-
jecting reasoned argument apart from that which is provided by some
particular tradition or other."9
To investigate the effect of jurisprudence on lawyer behavior,
Maclntyre would have us look at the question from the inside, as it
were. We must look at the practices of lawyers as they are defined by
the institutional arguments for them. These arguments themselves de-
fine the goals of these practices, their optimum use, and their inherent
limitations. When the standards of the tradition can no longer justify
its practices, new or modified arguments must be advanced or the
practices abandoned.' 0
Jurisprudence establishes the framework for legal thinking and
the behavior of lawyers. It defines what law is and how lawyers
should approach legal questions. Moreover, it sets the standards by
which legal discourse is evaluated. Of course, the question remains
exactly how jurisprudence influences lawyer behavior and how a per-
son should go about investigating its effect. Maclntyre notes that we
are not taught "a coherent way of thinking and judging, but one con-
structed out of an amalgam of social and cultural fragments inherited"
from the traditions that spawned our culture and the different tempo-
ral stages from which those fragments are derived.1'
7. ALASDAIR C. MACINTYRE, THREE RIVAL VERSIONS OF MORAL ENQUIRY: ENCY-
CLOPEDIA, GENEALOGY, AND TRADITION 17 (1990) [hereinafter MORAL ENQUIRY].
8. There is a "mode internal to that particular type of enquiry which already presup-
poses one particular theoretical or doctrinal stance and commitment rather than an-
other .... What is true of physical enquiry holds also for theological and moral enquiry.
What are taken to be the relevant data and how they are identified, characterized, and
classified will depend upon who is performing these tasks and what his or her theological
or moral standpoint and perspective is." MORAL ENQUIRY, supra note 7, at 17.
9. ALASDAIR C. MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? 350 (1988)
[hereinafter WHOSE JUSTICE].
10. See MORAL ENQUIRY, supra note 7, at 18. MacIntyre describes three modes of
moral enquiry: 1) The Encyclopedic-a belief in the continual progress of human culture,
and typified by the Encyclopedia Britannica's attempt to state the canon of then current
knowledge; 2) The Genealogical-a belief that the history of human culture is the story of
the individual will power and typified by Nietzsche's critique of the canon in Zur Genea-
logie der Moral; and 3) The Traditional-a belief that the history of human culture defines
the goals toward which we move and defines the current issues needed to be resolved to
move toward that goal and typified by Pope Leo XIII's encyclical Aeterni Patris.
11. WHOSE JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 2.
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Narrative jurisprudence provides one way to explore how juris-
prudence might influence lawyer behavior.12 The structure of one's
world view, that is, one's jurisprudence, emerges from the context of
an individual's life. However, there are problems with this approach.
When everyone's point of view is a jurisprudence, nothing is jurispru-
dence. When theory depends on the constellation of unique and par-
ticular circumstances, we must rely on the integrity of the narrator,
which may not always be justified.13 By investing every person's nar-
rative with the importance of every other narrative, it becomes diffi-
cult to effectively study any one jurisprudence.
Although I am skeptical about finding evidence of influence in
any particular lawyer's actions, I am not so skeptical about finding it
at the institutional level. If the influence of jurisprudence can be
found, there are several reasons why it will be found at the institu-
tional level.
Institutional discourse is the discourse of elites. 4 It is engaged in
by people who have the time, training, motivation, and resources to
stake out a position.'" They elaborate these positions by drawing
sharper and clearer lines to make their points of view stand out. The
great professional exertions needed to come up with professional
codes should be processes whereby jurisprudence will be the most
clearly distilled and have the most apparent influence. That is, the
effort by elite lawyers to construct a systematic set of rules will require
these lawyers to reflect on what they have been doing in their practice,
as well as the problems within it. A one-size-fits-all code must be set
at such a high level of generality that it will reflect less of the chaos of
12. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR
RACIAL JUSTICE Xi (1987) (examining the civil rights movement in order to justify what has
happened or not happened since and stating Bell's wish to explain how "black people...
feel about it"); Naomi R. Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, 81 GEO. L.J. 2475, 2475 (1993) (ex-
ploring the idea that although narratives are encouraged and stories celebrated, the possi-
bility of conflict and inconsistency cannot be overlooked); Richard Delgado, Storytelling
for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2411 (1989)
(noting that many authors tell stories "these days"). For an example of this technique from
a theological perspective, see MILNER S. BALL, THE WORD AND THE LAW (1993). But see,
Mark Tushnet, The Degradation of Constitutional Discourse, 81 GEO. L.J. 251, 251 (1992)
(arguing that standardless narrative may lead to false jurisprudence).
13. Tushnet, supra note 12, at 258.
14. Cf. JAMES D. HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA 59
(1991) (stating that "public disclosure ... is largely a discourse of elites"). Hunter dis-
cusses how elite elements within the American culture with the time and resources to do so
frame the political, cultural, and legal aspects of public debate. Most Americans find
themselves in the middle of a discourse of extremes. Moderate discourse is marginalized
by both extremes.
15. Id. at 59-60.
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everyday practice and more of the clear-but artificial-air of theory.
Paradoxically, it will be easier to delineate a jurisprudence by taking
the sum of individual chaotic practices. 6
Looking at lawyer codes for evidence of jurisprudence is also sug-
gested by the possible incongruity of "Codes" or "Rules" of ethics. If
one maintains a sharp distinction between law and ethics, then codes
of ethics are oxymorons. Ethical decision making cannot be bounded
by a set of rules any more than legal decision making can be accom-
plished by the roll of dice. 7 According to Stephen Salbu, "[c]odes of
ethics provide a sadly diluted notion of what ethics entails, how ethical
decisions are made, and the nature and degree of individual responsi-
bility involved in the process of examining one's choices.' 18
This is so because "legal reasoning is evoked to decide whether to
abide by clear-cut rules and regulations, [while] ... ethical reasoning
is triggered only by questions that lack an unambiguous response."' 19
Thus, when codes of ethics purport to provide rules, they confront an
individual with the choice to conform or not-a choice associated with
a coercive legal regime.2" True ethical decisions allow for an individ-
ual to weigh the multitude of factors that go into moral decision mak-
ing." The decision to conform is left to the uncoerced choice of the
individual.
According to Salbu's view, law is produced when codes of ethics
are written. If it is law, then what lawyers think about the nature of
16. An analogy from quantum physics will help explain my choice. Because codes
happen infrequently, they represent a snapshot of the bar's self understanding at a given
time. It is the measurement of the mass and motion of lawyers. Like subatomic particles,
the measurement we get is uncertain because in order to measure its mass we must stop its
motion and in order to measure its motion we must remove its mass. Thus. when we pro-
duce lawyer codes, we freeze time and motion. The codes are static entities which attempt
to say something to the dynamic reality of everyday practice. Thus, they will always be
uncertain reflections of that dynamic reality. In order to frame a code. we must stop the
practice long enough to make some decisions about it. While this can be done in the labo-
ratory or the committee meeting, in reality it is not feasible. By the time a code is finally
produced, it represents an old, if not obsolete, version of legal practice. Nevertheless,
codes may be the only way to measure the influence of jurisprudence on legal practice
because they are the only snapshots we have.
17. But see Lon L. Fuller, Irrigation and Tyranny, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1021, 1031 (1965)
[hereinafter Irrigation] (discussing the history and social utility of casting lots as a method
of resolving disputes).
18. Stephen R. Salbu, Law and Conformity, Ethics and Conflict: The Trouble with
Law-Based Conceptions of Ethics, 68 IND. L. REV. 101, 102 (1992).
19. Id. at 104.
20. Id. ("A.t the margins, where exercise of independent judgment would render di-
vergent opinions, the personal cost of coercion through the application of codes may be
extremely high.").
21. Id. at 105.
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law will profoundly and directly affect the structure and content of
these codes. Even if one does not accept the unyielding distinction
between law and ethics, one can agree that jurisprudence will affect
the structure and content of codes. If ethics is the way people make
decisions about how they should live, then law is the paramount social
ethics.22 Writing lawyer codes is an extension of ethical reasoning to a
specific and important application. The understanding of the nature
of law, the faith in its processes, and its rhetorical structures will natu-
rally find their way into lawyer codes.
B. The Rise and Fall of Lon Fuller's Jurisprudence, the Model
Code, and the Model Rules
The answer to the institutional question can now take shape. The
dominant jurisprudential mode of the time will be reflected in the
structure, style, and, to a lesser degree, content of the profession's
commonly accepted standards of professional behavior.23 This Article
will focus on the way in which Lon Fuller's jurisprudence influenced
the 1969 Model Code of Professional Responsibility. When this juris-
prudence fell from prominence and a new orthodoxy replaced it, the
very differently structured Model Rules of Professional Conduct
resulted.
Specifically, the Model Code illustrates Lon Fuller's ideas con-
cerning the dual moralities of aspiration and duty and the embodi-
ment of moral values in legal processes. The Code's three-part
structure of Canons, Ethical Considerations, and mandatory Discipli-
nary Rules follow Fuller's delineations. As per Fuller's jurisprudence,
the combination of aspiration and duty was meant to elevate and dis-
cipline, educate and punish. The Model Code established the mini-
mum standards of conduct so that it might become possible for
lawyers to transcend the minimums and strive for excellence.
In contrast, the Model Rules illustrate the revival of legal realism,
its blending with positivism, and their eventual victory over their juris-
22. See, e.g., Thomas L. Shaffer, The Practice of Law as Moral Discourse, 55 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 231, 232-33 (1979) (asserting that conversation between lawyers and clients
inherently involves morality).
23. The content of the Code will be more directly influenced by the personal interests
of lawyers themselves. Compare Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical
Rules?, 59 TEX. L. REV. 639, 653 (1981) (arguing ethical codes are attempts to control the
market for legal services) with Deborah L. Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A Functional
Perspective on Professional Codes, 59 TEX. L. REV. 689, 689 (1981) (stating that lawyer
codes consistently resolved moral, social, and political conflicts in favor of lawyers). See
also Posner, supra note 4, at 1 (proposing that mainstream legal thought is a byproduct of
the cartel-like organization of the legal profession).
1996]
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prudential rivals. The Model Rules outline only the basic norms of
professional behavior. They reflect the positivism of their drafters
and the realism of their enactors. They are not meant to suggest any
metaphysical ideal. At the bottom, they are pragmatic and positive,
conceived as a comprehensive legislative codification of the current
practices of lawyers and designed to give lawyers answers to their pro-
fessional responsibility questions.
There are two primary reasons to investigate the relationship of
Fuller's thought and the Model Code. First, Fuller was a very influen-
tial figure in Post-World War II American jurisprudence. In a para-
graph that may only be slightly hyperbolic, Robert Summers called
Fuller "a major figure in modern legal theory," "unquestionably the
leading secular natural lawyer of the twentieth century," "the greatest
proceduralist in the history of legal theory," "one of the foremost the-
orists of means-ends relations in legal ordering," and a "major critic"
of British and European Positivism, as well as American Instrumental-
ist theory.24 Multiple jurisprudential schools claimed as well as de-
rided Fuller.25 Such breadth suggested that his point of view might be
compatible with the broader goals of the legal profession's elite.
These are the people with the influence and the resources to spend
time writing codes of conduct. Second, there are obvious similarities
between Fuller's moralities of aspiration and duty and the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility's structure.
In spite of Fuller's influence, the Model Code did not last very
long as the official statement of lawyer ethics. The Model Code had
been adopted over few objections. Nevertheless, fewer than ten years
since its adoption, the ABA appointed a commission to revise the
Code. Five years later the ABA replaced the Model Code with the
Model Rules. How was it possible that the profession could so com-
pletely outgrow its standards of professional conduct in so short a
time? The answer lies in the jurisprudence of the time-during that
time the profession rejected the jurisprudence on which the Code was
modeled and accepted a very different one. This jurisprudential
change led the drafters of the Model Rules to reject the structure of
the Model Code.
I do not mean to overstate Fuller's influence. The Model Code is
not a systematic elaboration of Fuller's views. I have no evidence that
the drafters of the Code consulted Fuller, read Fuller, or even in-
24. PROFILES, supra note 1, at 15i.
25. See infra Part lI.B.
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tended to model the Code on Fuller's thought.26 Thus, there will not
be a point by point coherence between Fuller's jurisprudence and the
Model Code, particularly in the content of the Disciplinary Rules
themselves. By the same token, the Model Rules are not a systematic
refutation of Fuller. I amconly pointing out the significant congruities
between Fuller's statement of the reciprocal relationship between as-
piration and duty in the law, the Code's attempt to structure its provi-
sions to do the same, and the Model Rule's rejection of this structure
and relationship.
We can see Fuller's influence in the Code's three-part structure of
Canons, Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules. This struc-
ture suggests Fuller's ideas on the distinction between the moralities
of aspiration and duty, the necessary connection of law and morality,
and the necessity of the lawyer's fidelity to the legal system. While
Fuller's influence may not have been direct, his basic ideas formed a
point of view about the law, lawyers, and the legal system that shaped
the way the drafters saw their task, the professional problems they
believed needed to be solved, and their understanding of the role of
lawyers in society. Further, it may have guided the decisions about
the appropriate structures necessary for professional regulation.
The identification of positivism and legal realism with totalitari-
anism prompted a Post-World War II jurisprudential project to find a
moral basis for law. Citizens in general sought reassurance that the
American way of life was superior to other cultural forms. Legal
thinkers shared in this desire.2" Thus, it became necessary not only to
describe the workings of our legal system, but also to demonstrate
that it was better than other foreign systems. Legal realism and posi-
tivism both failed to provide this assurance. They could as easily de-
scribe and justify foreign systems as well. The superiority of the
26. See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
27. It would be possible to conduct a Fullerian critique of the Code and the Rules. It
might point out what Fuller would have included in the Code, how he might have drafted
the provisions, what he would have prohibited, and what he would have encouraged, even
how he might have revised the Code if he had served on the Kutak Commission. But that
is for another day. Here I will sketch the influence of some of Fuller's basic insights on the
Code. They can be detected most easily in the Code's structure, style, and, to a lesser
degree, its content.
28. One reason to reverse the Plessy "separate but equal" doctrine was to demon-
strate the superiority of the American political, economic, and legal systems over commu-
nism. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 524-25 (1980) (giving credibility to battle to win third
world "hearts and minds").
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American system could be demonstrated only by establishing that it
rested on, proceeded from, or carried into being moral norms.29
To the generation that fought and won World War II and which
was fighting a Cold War with communism, Fuller's discussion of the
profound morality of the legal system and its superiority over compet-
ing (i.e., European) systems must have made both intellectual and vis-
ceral sense. Fuller understood the lawyer's role to be intimately tied
to social freedom.30 If the purpose of law was to create the social
structures in which people led productive, useful lives, then lawyers
were the primary architects of this freedom. 31 Law was a moral and
social enterprise. Lawyers therefore had unique moral and social
responsibilities.
In the same way that the Model Code suggests Fuller's influence,
the Model Rules suggest a different jurisprudence. The jurisprudence
that influenced the Model Code relinquished its dominant position
during the ten years after the Code was first presented. Whereas
Fuller's jurisprudence and the related legal process school may have
dominated the field during the 1960's,32 the field changed dramatically
in the 1970's. Realism rebounded after its disappearance following
World War II and positivism lost the taint of its association with Na-
29. Frederick Schauer makes the point that Fuller's jurisprudence can best be under-
stood if one takes into account Fuller's position inside the legal system. Frederick Schauer,
Fuller's Internal Point of View, 13 LAW & PHIL. 285 (1994). Schauer argues that Fuller
wrote for lawyers and sought to prove to them that their work had moral value. Id. at
304-05.
30. Fuller understood freedom in a positive sense, i.e., as a "freedom to" and not
solely a "freedom from." Lon L. Fuller, Freedom-A Suggested Analysis, 68 HARV. L.
REV. 1305 (1955) [hereinafter Freedom]. "Freedom from" can be easily manipulated be-
yond recognition and implies nothing about the nature of the person who is free. On the
other hand, "freedom to" implies a range of alternatives and suggests that the free person
"is a living creature capable of purposive action." Id. at 1306-07. Lawyers served this
latter kind of freedom by facilitating the social, cultural, political, and economic activity of
their clients. See Lon L. Fuller, What the Law Schools Can Contribute to the Making of
Lawyers, I J. LEGAL EDuc. 189, 202 (1948) [hereinafter Law Schools] (examining the four
objectives of legal education: to give students knowledge; to impart skills; to study great
minds; and to give students insight into the process in which lawyers participate in adjudi-
cation and legislation).
31. Lon L. Fuller, On Teaching Law, 3 STAN. L. REV. 35, 37 (1950) [hereinafter
Teaching] (asserting that training students to think like lawyers fits their minds into a pre-
existing social framework). See also, SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 1, at 275-77 (describing
the lawyer as the person who helps clients achieve "ways of living together" by resolving
differences and constructing workable arrangements).
32. See, e.g., HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (Wil-
liam N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (which was published after their
deaths, and remained in unofficial, yet very wide circulation for decades).
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zism. The two combined formed a prevailing orthodoxy that defined
other jurisprudential forms unworthy and unworkable.
This orthodoxy influenced the drafting of the Model Rules in the
same way that Fuller's thought influenced the drafting of the Model
Code. I believe that because Fuller's influence was so obvious in the
structure of the Code, it was natural that the new orthodoxy would
seek to eliminate the traces of the old.33
In the end, Fuller may not have influenced the drafters directly
but he almost certainly reflected their understanding of themselves
and the role that they and the law played in a democracy. For this
reason alone, the connection between Lon Fuller's thought and the
Code of Professional Responsibility deserves attention.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF FULLER'S THOUGHT
A. Introduction
What follows is not a systematic or complete treatment of Fuller's
jurisprudence. 34 Instead, I have isolated elements of Fuller's thought
that seem to have influenced the structure, style, and content of the
33. Cf Kenneth I. Winston, Introduction, 13 LAW & PHIL. 253, 253 (1994) (Fuller fell
from grace "because the generation of scholars immediately succeeding him regarded his
work as failing to meet the standards of argument set by the dominant mode of discourse
in Anglo-American philosophy.").
Once again, I want to distinguish critique from description. I will not perform a Ful-
lerian critique of the Model Rules nor, for that matter a positivist or a realist one. I only
hope to show how the Model Rules are animated and directed by different conception of
law and the lawyer's role. I outline, but do not fully develop, the possible consequences
that may flow from this different conception.
34. Indeed, Fuller did not present a systematic treatment of his jurisprudence. He
wrote a series of books and articles that treated aspects of his overall thought but never set
out a definitive statement of his jurisprudence. In fact, his books seem only to suggest the
outlines of a grand theory. Winston's book, The Principles of Social Order, gathers to-
gether excerpts of Fuller's published works as well as many of his unpublished works. So-
CIAL ORDER, supra note 1, at 11. Winston's book follows the outline Fuller made for a
systematic work called The Principles of Social Order. Winston's collection attempts to set
out, for the first time, the elements of Fuller's grand theory. Winston argues that Fuller's
failure to list these elements during his lifetime resulted in a great deal of misunderstand-
ing of Fuller's thought, and precipitated a good deal of unjustified criticism. Id. at 11-12. I
do not take sides in this debate. Although I am attracted to Fuller's way of thinking, the
thesis of this Article does not require that I advocate for Fuller and his jurisprudence.
Instead, I am only trying to describe what appears to me to be the influence of Fuller in the
Model Code and the subsequent banishment of Fullerian influence from the Model Rules.
In addition, I will outline some of the possible consequences of this change. For general
treatments of the contemporary jurisprudence wars from different perspectives see GARY
MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS (1995) and RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990). For a useful survey of the development of various
jurisprudential schools, see BAILEY KUKLIN & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, FOUNDATION OF THE
LAW: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY AND JURISPRUDENTIAL PRIMER (1994).
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final version of the 1969 Model Code of Professional Responsibility.
These elements are:
1. The Inner Morality of law embodied in legal structures and
processes.
2. The distinction between a morality of aspiration and a moral-
ity of duty.
3. The relationship of legal forms to the realization of individual
choice.
4. The lawyer as a social architect.
B. Fuller's Place in American Jurisprudence
Lon Fuller's jurisprudence cannot be easily categorized. He
sided with the legal realists and vigorously rejected formalism." Nev-
ertheless, he also rejected the legal realists' basic contention that law
was either sociology or instrumental politics. 36 In addition, Fuller also
attacked positivism for being consistent with totalitarianism. 37
Although he has been called an advocate of a "secular natural law"
theory,38 Fuller also rejected a great deal of the natural law
tradition.39
Fuller's refusal or inability to construct a place for himself within
conventional theoretical categories caused his thought to suffer some-
times unwarranted criticism and to be misunderstood. It has also
caused later interpreters to attempt to solve the problem by teasing
35. See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 429 (1934)
(using Karl Llewellyn's work as representative of legal realism).
36. LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 52-55 (1940) [hereinafter QUEST].
37. Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71
HARV. L. REV. 630, 659 (1958) [hereinafter Fidelity] (asserting that German legal positiv-
ism, from legal science consideration of the moral ends of law, paved the way for the rise of
the Nazis).
38. SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 1, at 11.
39. In A Rejoinder to Professor Nagel, 3 NAT. L. F. 83 (1958), Fuller wrote:
To avoid further misunderstanding I should like to record here that I do not ac-
cept any "doctrine of natural law" which asserts one or more of the following
propositions: 1) The notion that the demands of the natural law can be the sub-
ject of an authoritative pronouncement; 2) the notion that there is something
called "the natural law" capable of concrete application like a written code; 3) the
notion that there is a "higher law" transcending the concerns of this life against
which human enactments must be measured and declared invalid in case of
conflict.
Id. at 84.
In the same piece, Fuller went on to say that Aristotle did not seem to adhere to these
views either. Id. To consider Fuller's qualification of his argument in favor of a revival of
natural law thought see QUEST, supra note 36, at 100-01. For an argument that in spite of
Fuller's protestations he espoused a version of natural law apparent in his emphasis on
method and his understanding of the connection between substance and method, see Rob-
ert C. L. Moffat, Lon Fuller: Natural Lawyer After All!, 26 AM. J. JURIS. 190 (1981).
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Fuller's true theory from his work. 0 Whether or not there is a grand
Fullerian theory, the best way to understand Fuller is to take Fuller on
his own terms. He should be viewed as an "insider" whose philosoph-
ical task was to "decide how he and his fellow lawyers may best spend
their professional lives."'41 Instead of trying to find a grand theoretical
structure, we should look to describe the vision of the law and the
lawyer's role toward which Fuller's thought aimed.42 This will not
only yield a better understanding of Fuller's thought, but it will also be
more consistent with Fuller's jurisprudential method.
C. Law as a Structure of Social Order
Fuller placed the human community at the center of law. He de-
fined Law as the purposive attempt to subject human enterprises to
the governance of rules.43 Fuller argued that law represents the
human attempt to construct models of legal or social processes.
44
Although individual choices play a role, those choices are ineffective
unless society creates some social mechanisms to facilitate and protect
them.
In all significant areas of human action formal arrangements are
required to make choice effective. . . . Our more important
choices are meaningless if there is no way of carrying them over
into the larger social order on which we are dependent for al-
most all our satisfactions. But to give social effect to individual
choice, some formal arrangement, some form of social order, is
necessary.45
Fuller distinguished substantive principles of law from rules of
social order. These substantive principles are derived, according to
classic natural lawyers, from an understanding of human nature.
Fuller said that he could not see any standard for making moral deci-
40. See, e.g., SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 1, at 11-12 (attempting to construct the co-
herent exposition of Fuller's theory that Fuller outlined, but never finished, using the con-
cept of eunomics). See also, PROFILES, supra note 1, at vii (offering a "reconstruction" of
Fuller's thoughts because "Fuller did not always develop his views systematically, and he
did not always see how to get the most theoretical mileage out of his insights").
41. QUEST. supra note 36, at 2. For an article discussing the development of Fuller's
idea of internality, see Schauer, supra note 29.
42. Peter R. Teachout, The Soul of the Fugue: An Essay on Reading Fuller, 70 MINN.
L. REV. 1073, 1075 (1986) (noting that scholars have failed to form a coherent theoretical
system from Fuller's writings because the writings do not themselves yield one).
43. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 145 (1964) [hereinafter MORALITY]
(stating that law is "a purposeful enterprise, dependent for its success on the energy, in-
sight, intelligence, and conscientiousness of those who conduct it").
44. SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 1, at 27.
45. SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 1, at 26.
1996]
316 SOUTH TEXAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:303
sions except "that which is in keeping with man's 46 nature as it would
be if it were able to resolve its disharmonies and to surmount its im-
perfections. '47 Fuller did not elaborate on the substantive features of
natural law, however. He was more concerned with deriving the natu-
ral law of human social structures. As he said, he was "concerned
with the glue that holds together what one writer has called the furni-
ture of society and not the structure of the furniture itself."1
48
Fuller connected legal rules to the needs of the general and spe-
cific human communities in which all people lived. Rules of law are
needed to "keep peace," to allow people to "deal justly" with one
another, and to enable people to "collaborate effectively" with one
another.49 He understood law in relation to the social goals it
serves-personal security, just dealing, and effective collaboration.
Law is not strictly instrumental, however. Means and ends both con-
stitute and structure social life.50 They "move in circles" so that un-
derstanding one helps establish and understand the other.5 This is
what Fuller called Eunomics-"the science, theory, or study of good
order and workable social arrangements. '51 For Fuller, the crucial
evaluative question did not simply concern the fit between means and
ends. Rather, the key question was what kinds of human communities
these means and ends created.53 The good social order is not the or-
der of "a concentration camp-but is an order that is just, fair, worka-
ble, effective, and respectful of human dignity.
54
46. I will be quoting Fuller extensively. As was the custom of his time, Fuller used the
masculine pronoun to refer to people in general. I will quote Fuller as in the original
without resorting to the intrusive and somewhat arrogant "sic" whenever he uses the mas-
culine in a generic way. The reader should be aware that I do not limit his insights to men
only.
47. SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 1, at 12.
48. SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 1, at 71.
49. LON L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW 6 (1968) [hereinafter ANATOMY] ("For
men to live together successfully they need rules that will keep peace among them, make
them deal justly with one another, and enable them to collaborate effectively [with one
another].").
50. Summers, supra note 2, at 438.
51. Lon L. Fuller, Human Purpose and Natural Law, 3 NAT. L. F. 68, 72 (1958). See a
discussion of this point in Moffat, supra note 39, at 191-92. See generally SOCIAL ORDER,
supra note 1, at 47-64 (containing the text of Fuller's previously unpublished essay, Means
and Ends).
52. SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 1, at 48. See also Lon L. Fuller, American Legal Phi-
losophy at Mid-Century: A Review of Edwin Patterson's Jurisprudence: Men and Ideas of
the Law, 6 J. LEGAL EDUC. 457 (1954) [hereinafter American Legal Philosophy].
53. Summers, supra note 2, at 439.
54. SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 1, at 47.
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These are not higher rules in any metaphysical sense. Rather,
they are like the natural laws of carpentry or architecture or music-
specific ways to accomplish socially defined goals. After discussing
Stravinsky's Poetics of Music, Fuller said:
It is easier to define a perfect omelet than it is to describe the
most delectable dish imaginable. To say that a lawyer arguing a
case within the limits of forensic procedure achieved perfection
in his art is to convey more meaning than to assert of an argu-
ment that it is the best conceivable in any context. In all areas,
from the most trivial to the most exalted, the mind is compelled
to sharpen its judgment by narrowing its range. Some limitation
of means, imposed by circumstances or voluntarily accepted, is
essential for an intelligent definition of the end sought.5
Social structures are the institutional forms in which human free-
dom is possible. "One cannot think about social goals (ends) without
also thinking about social structures (means). ' 56 For individuals and
for society, the moral life "is one that forms a coherent pattern, not
one that is manipulated to bring about a series of desirable states of
mind and body."57 Staking out his typical middle-ground, Fuller
concluded:
We can agree that it is definitely undesirable that the whole of
human life should receive its pattern from social institutions.
This does not preclude an equal agreement that our social insti-
tutions should be so designed as to give coherent meaning and
direction to that portion of the life of man that is their proper
province. 8
Fuller described two different kinds of human associations: those
organized by legal principles and those organized by common aims.59
The former is typified by the market economy or the political system,
while the latter is typified by small voluntary associations like families
or churches. 6° These are not necessarily different forms of organiza-
55. SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 1, at 51.
56. SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 1, at 57.
57. SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 1, at 58.
58. SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 1, at 58.
59. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 353
(1978) [hereinafter Forms and Limits].
60. SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 1, at 67. Fuller goes on to suggest that the different
forms of associations require different modes of problem solving or dispute resolution.
The reciprocal society may rely on more formal means of resolution while the smaller
should rely on less formal, more open textured methods. Interestingly, the United States
Supreme Court drew the same distinction years later in Roberts v. United States Jaycees,
468 U. S. 609 (1984), where Justice Brennan's opinion suggests a freedom of association
along Fullerian lines-public associations subject to more formal rules than private
associations.
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tion. Rather, legality or commonality provide different principles by
which associations can be organized. In fact, all associations display
both principles. The issue is which principle predominates. 61
D. Law as the Language of Social Interaction
To interact effectively, people needed a situation where the activi-
ties of others took on some predictability. Customary law, which
Fuller described as a "language of interaction, '' 62 provided that regu-
larity because it structured activity. Individuals could expect that
others with whom they were dealing would act according to the cus-
tom. 63 Calling this unwritten law a code was not an exaggeration:
The word code is appropriate here because what is involved is
not simply a negation, a prohibition of certain disapproved ac-
tions, but also the obverse side of this negation, the meaning it
confers on foreseeable and approved actions, which then furnish
a point of orientation for ongoing interactive responses.'
This customary law showed up in private forms of dispute resolu-
tion like private contract, mediation, and arbitration. Fuller spent a
good deal of his career describing and justifying these various forms.
65
Fuller was not concerned here with crowded court dockets or efficient
case handling, however, in the fashion of so many contemporary advo-
cates of alternative dispute resolution. Rather, he saw these as differ-
ent manifestations of the complementary forms of social organization.
Thus, they were not alternatives to legal methods. Instead,
it becomes apparent that in a complex modern society enacted
law and the organizational principles implicit in customary law
are not simply to be viewed as alternative ways of ordering
61. SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 1, at 76. Fuller describes the inherent tension between
the two principles. In one passage he describes the longstanding conflict in religious orga-
nizations between Spirit and Law. Quoting a "well known theologian," he concludes by
stating that "[w]hen the Spirit of God has burnt itself out, or lost its vigor, Canon Law
proliferates." Id. at 80. Fuller criticized the "creeping legalism" of voluntary associations.
Id. at 79. To him, organizations which rest on shared commitment cannot substitute formal
legal procedures and remain the same. Id. at 80. The change in procedures irreparably
damages the association and changes its character. At the same time, Fuller reminds the
reader that all organizations require a blend of both principles. Id. at 72. The issue is not
simply Spirit versus Law or Commitment versus Formality. It is the blend of the two and
the corresponding creation of the appropriate processes for that precise blend. Id. at 84.
62. SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 1, at 213 (emphasis omitted).
63. SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 1, at 213-14.
64. SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 1, at 213-14.
65. See generally Lon L. Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L.
REV. 305 (1971) [hereinafter Mediation] (suggesting that mediation is always directed at
bringing about a more harmonious relationship between the parties); Forms and Limits,
supra note 59, at 388-91; SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 1, at 169.
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men's interactions, but rather as often serving to supplement
each other by a kind of natural division of labor.66
It was not enough for Fuller to identify this phenomena, however.
Without going further, customary law and private social arrangements
could be as oppressive and mysterious as made law and public institu-
tions. Society could have rules either "imposed on it from above...
[or] it may also reach out for rules by a kind of inarticulate collective
preference." 67 Such a view left no room for the person and the exer-
cise of human reason. Law from above was imposed without the par-
ticipation or understanding of the persons affected, while law from
below bubbled up without the acknowledgment of human agency.68
Given the necessity of people to live and work in social groups,
Fuller argued that the customary ways that people structured their
relationships constituted a natural law of human society.69 He com-
pared this work to architecture where the principles for constructing a
building do not change. Instead, only the circumstances in which
these principles are applied change: "[T]here are principles of sound
social architecture, objectively given, and ...these principles, like
those of physical architecture do not change with every shift in the
details of the design toward which they are directed."7
The range of existing private orderings was not a failure of law. It
showed the creative human person at work, organizing particular rela-
tionships in ways appropriate for each context.71 This task was both
moral and practical. These competing conceptions, both equally valid,
require human judgment and cooperation in their resolution. In this
view, the lawmaker is engaged in the
process of reasoned discovery, rather than sheer invention, of
the legal forms appropriate to introducing coherent and authori-
tative decisionmaking into particular social situations. It is this
necessity of being responsive to external realities ... that Fuller
took to be the fundamental insight of traditional natural law
theory.7 2
66. SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 1, at 246.
67. SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 1, at 216.
68. ANATOMY, supra note 49, at 40 ("[T]he human element ... is also an indispensa-
ble ingredient in any just and humane legal system. The complex undertaking we call 'law'
requires at every turn the exercise of judgment, and that judgment must be exercised by
human beings for human beings.").
69. ANATOMY, supra note 49, at 116.
70. ANATOMY, supra note 49, at 116.
,71. Freedom, supra note 30, at 1312.
72. SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 1, at 13.
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E. The Moralities of Duty and Aspiration
For law to be both effective and valid it had to be backed by
moral authority. No form of law can survive without a clear purpose
and a social consensus on its uses.73 As Robert Summers described it,
Fuller believed that law had to "be argued for."'74 Otherwise, there is
no incentive to obey the law and no purpose in doing so. Fuller ar-
gued that the principles of social order, discoverable by reason and
present in all forms of social ordering, gave law its essential morality,
or what he called its internal morality.75 Fuller saw law as composed
of two distinct but related moralities: a morality of aspiration and a
morality of duty.7 6 The morality of aspiration was best exemplified by
the classical Greek notion of human "excellence, of the fullest realiza-
tion of human powers."'7 7 An aspirational morality starts at the top of
human conduct with a conception of what is proper and fitting human
conduct. It is "conduct such as beseems a human being functioning at
his best."'78 The morality of aspiration asks how we can "make the
best use of our short lives."'79 It is related to the economic notion of
marginal utility-the best use of finite resources. The morality of
duty, on the other hand, began at the bottom of human conduct. It
"lays down the basic rules without which an ordered society is impos-
sible, or without which an ordered society directed toward certain spe-
cific goals must fail of its mark."8" It is concerned not with utility but
with exchange.8 '
Moral aspirations impel a person toward excellence while moral
duties warn a person against transgression. Thus, aspirations are
stated positively while duties are prohibitory. However, duty and as-
piration work together. Fuller used gambling as an example. Looking
at the question from the standpoint of duty, a hypothetical legislator
might ask what harms occur from the activity of gambling. The dili-
gent legislator, using a morality of aspiration, will focus on whether or
not gambling is an activity which befits a "man's capacities."'  Aspi-
ration cannot effectively state a standard below which a person can be
punished, however, because
73. ANATOMY, supra note 49, at 68-69.
74. Summers, supra note 2, at 441.
75. MORALITY, supra note 43, at 4.
76. MORALITY, supra note 43, at 4.
77. MORALITY, supra note 43, at 5.
78. MORALITY, supra note 43, at 5.
79. MORALITY, supra note 43, at 17.
80. MORALITY, supra note 43, at 5-6.
81. MORALITY, supra note 43, at 19.
82. MORALITY, supra note 43, at 8.
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[t]here is no way by which the law can compel a man to live up
to the excellences of which he is capable. For workable stan-
dards of judgment the law must turn to its blood cousin, the mo-
rality of duty. There, if anywhere, it will find help in deciding
whether gambling ought to be legally prohibited. 3
The morality of duty may state the minimum standards in order
to avoid harm to the individual and to society but these standards
must not reach too far. They can "only seek to exclude ... the grosser
and more obvious [forms and] manifestations of chance and irrational-
ity."'  Duty can only create the "conditions essential for rational
human existence. These are the necessary, but not the sufficient con-
ditions [sic] for the achievement of [human excellence]." 85
Law can be compared to a step ladder-at the bottom are the
"obvious demands of social living."'  Such social duties include per-
sonal security and respect for property. At the other end of the ladder
are the highest levels of human achievement. Moral enquiry consists
of drawing "the dividing line where the pressure of duty leaves off and
the challenge of excellence begins. "87 Fuller rejected the implication
of the Platonic argument that one cannot know bad human conduct
without some knowledge of perfectly good human conduct. The Pla-
tonic argument suggests that it is impossible to acquire such perfect
knowledge, thereby making it impossible to properly draw a line be-
tween duty and aspiration.88 This leads to either a false confidence in
our knowledge or a false pessimism about our abilities.
Fuller responded to the Platonic argument by pointing to com-
mon human experiences. We do not need a picture of the perfect
human life to ban murder.89 We do so on the basis that no excellence,
no social organization is even possible without the elementary protec-
tion from violence. We do not, and cannot, have a picture of the per-
fect life. In this respect, all law is imperfect but, nevertheless it is
useful. Much like no one tool is perfectly suited for any particular
task, no individual law is perfectly suited for any problem. Yet all
tools can accomplish a wide range of tasks fairly well.90 Only when
the person uses the tool at the limits of its range do we begin to find
its limitations:
83. MORALITY, supra note 43, at 9.
84. MORALITY, supra note 43, at 9.
85. MORALITY, supra note 43, at 9.
86. MORALITY, supra note 43, at 9.
87. MORALITY, supra note 43, at 10.
88. MORALITY, supra note 43, at 10.
89. MORALITY, supra note 43, at 11.
90. MORALrrY, supra note 43, at 11.
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A carpenter's hanmer serves adequately over a large but indefi-
nite range of uses, revealing its deficiencies only when we try to
use it to drive very small tacks or heavy tent stakes. If a working
companion asks me for a hammer, or the nearest thing to it
available to me, I know at once, without knowing precisely what
operation he is undertaking, that many tools will be useless to
him. I do not pass him a screwdriver or a length of rope. I can,
in short, know the bad on the basis of very imperfect notions of
what would be good to perfection. So I believe it is with social
rules and institutions. We can, for example, know what is
plainly unjust without committing ourselves to declare with fi-
nality what perfect justice would be like.9'
Drawing the line between duty and aspiration will not always be
easy. Rather than despair of the task, however, Fuller would have us
confront it directly. There will be differences of opinion but Fuller
says "[w]e know enough to create the conditions that ... permit a man
to lift himself upward.192 As a person aspires to excellence, that per-
son is nevertheless a social being. The higher reaches of aspiration are
somewhat individualistic and subjective. Without aspiration, there
would be no society beyond purely animal or basic existence. 93 The
reach toward excellence both constitutes and continues possible
human community.
94
Because duties state minimum requirements, there must be some
incentive to obey them. Fuller suggests that the notion of reciprocity
provides the basis for compliance with moral duties. Once some stan-
dard is set there must be some way to measure conduct against it.
This measurement necessarily rests on a comparison of the "social
fabric that unites strands of individual action." 95 Any break in the
fabric frees the individual from the responsibility to obey.96 Thus, rec-
iprocity is at the core of duty. Without reciprocity, that is, without a
social conception of the content of duty, there is no likelihood that
anyone will obey.
This generates three conditions which help determine the maxi-
mum efficacy of duty:
91. MORALITY, supra note 43, at 11-12.
92. MORALITY, supra note 43, at 12.
93. MORALITY, supra note 43, at 13 (stating that if "we were cut off from our social
inheritance of language, thought, and art, none of us could aspire to anything much above
a purely animal existence").
94. MORALITY, supra note 43, at 13.
95. MORALITY, supra note 43, at 22.
96. MORALITY, supra note 43, at 22 (concluding that any sufficient rupture in the
social fabric released people from their duties).
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First, the relationship of reciprocity out of which the duty arises
must result from a voluntary agreement between the parties im-
mediately affected; they themselves "create" the duty. Second,
the reciprocal performances of the parties must in some sense
be equal in value. ... Third, the relationships within the society
must be sufficiently fluid so that the same duty you owe me to-
day, I may owe you tomorrow-in other words, the relationship
of duty must in theory and in practice be reversible. 7
Once the duties are defined and the conditions for their maxi-
mum efficacy are laid out, the problem shifts to the location of the line
between duty and aspiration. Duties stated too broadly, or too ab-
stractly, or too virtuously impede a person's progress toward excel-
lence. It is too frustrating to be punished for failing to meet the
highest standards when by definition few, if any, can actually meet
them. Thus, the location of the line is both a theoretical and a practi-
cal problem.
This line of division serves as an essential bulwark between the
two moralities. If the morality of duty reaches upward beyond
its proper sphere the iron hand of imposed obligation may stifle
experiment, inspiration, and spontaneity. If the morality of as-
piration invades the province of duty, men may begin to weigh
and qualify their obligations by standards of their own.98
The line must be drawn with care because the two moralities dic-
tate different ways to encourage compliance. The morality of duty
implies that failure brings punishment. If duty represents society's
lowest expectation of an individual within it, then praising one for
meeting the duty is not fitting. Punishment for such low standards
seems to more closely conform to our expectations. On the other
hand, the morality of aspiration represents the highest standards of
human conduct. Not everyone will attain these levels. Even partial
attainment is worthy of praise and reward. In this way, others are
encouraged to follow the example of the person honored.
This difference implies a difference in the standards and proce-
dures by which the punishment is administered or the reward is given.
Punishment is surrounded by procedural and formal guarantees to
prevent subjective preference from intruding. At the same time, such
guarantees would be out of place when bestowing an award for excel-
lence because the award itself represents an imperfect and somewhat
subjective judgment.99
97. MORALITY, supra note 43, at 23 (emphasis added).
98. MORALITY, supra note 43, at 27-28.
99. MORALITY, supra note 43, at 30-31. The location of the line between duty and
aspiration is suggested by the essentially procedural dictates of the inner morality of the
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F. Fuller's View of Lawyers
Fuller's jurisprudence led him to a specific view of lawyers. Law-
yers were important social figures because of the profound morality
that lay at the heart of their fundamental tasks. Fuller recognized that
lawyers were both litigators and planners, trial warriors and trusted
confidants, advocates and mediators. Fuller's thoughts unified these
disparate roles by stressing the inner morality at their core.
Fuller believed that a profound morality justified the adversary
system. 100 Legal structures embody moral aspirations and moral prin-
ciples.' 01 Although Fuller never elaborated on the actual moral prin-
ciples, he suggested that personal security and liberty suffer whenever
a society cannot effectively and peacefully settle its disputes. Without
law. Fuller identifies eight qualities inherent in this inner morality. If a law or legal system
fails completely in any one of these aspects, it cannot be called law. The eight qualities are
as follows:
1) There must be general rules, obviating the need for ad hoc determinations;
2) The rules must be promulgated;
3) The rules must be prospective, not retroactive;
4) The rules must be clear;
5) The rules must not require contradictory actions;
6) The rules must not require impossible actions;
7) The rules must remain relatively constant over time; and
8) There must a congruence between the declared rules and the actions of those
administering the rules.
These canons are not to be mechanically applied. Rather, they serve as guidelines for
the diligent legislator. It is relatively easy to state duties as prohibitions. They can be
narrow and particular. Although they cannot be retroactive, prohibitory rules can be back-
ward-looking in the sense that they are responses to past events which the law maker
wishes to avoid in the future. But these canons of lawmaking that comprise the inner
morality of law suggest that diligent lawmakers should do more than respond to past
events with a series of "thou shalt nots." Instead, the diligent can strive, as far as possible,
to frame laws to be as that satisfy the eight canons. For example, perfect clarity, generality,
and constancy may not be possible. The lawmaker, however, can try to frame laws as clear,
general, and constant as possible under the circumstances. Continuing critique of the laws
using these canons will reveal their weaknesses and lead to better clarity, generality, and
constancy.
I have drawn this summary largely from SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 1, at 158. Fuller
describes these standards in two books, MORALITY, supra note 43, and ANATOMY, supra
note 49. Fuller explained that these eight canons stated a kind of natural law of human law
making-"What I have tried to do is to discern and articulate the natural laws of a particu-
lar kind of human undertaking, which I have described as 'the enterprise of subjecting
human conduct to the governance of rules."' MORALITY, supra note 43, at 96.
These natural laws are not substantive in any significant way. Rather, they are proce-
dural in that they lay out the way substantive choices can be made and structured. The
substantive goals are the external morality of the law, determined by other means and
analyses. The ideal judge is neutral as to these externals but committed to the internal
morality.
100. SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 1, at 289.
101. SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 1, at 14.
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such mechanisms, people could not pursue the good life. Lawyers cre-
ate and preserve the means which make human society possible.
10 2
At the same time, lawyers do more than try cases-lawyers are
mediators, arbitrators, planners, counselors, and negotiators. If there
is a natural law of procedures and institutions, then lawyers are in the
best position to discern and apply this natural law. Lawyers are ex-
perts in social structure and thus are social architects when called
upon to plan and create solutions to client's problems. 10 3 Because
lawyers understand the underlying principles of social order, they
should be able to design systems and processes that will solve the
unique problems presented by the clients' situation. Fuller saw law as
a "purposeful enterprise, dependent for its success on the energy, in-
sight, intelligence, and conscientiousness of those who conduct it."' 04
These purposive, energetic, intelligent people are lawyers.
Fuller rejected the realists' position that law was essentially the
formal actions of authoritative institutions. A realist lawyer predicted
the decisions of these institutions. Unconcerned with improving the
"law," the realist lawyer instead attempted to become a technician
skilled at manipulating the levers of authoritative institutions. 0 5 Such
a view had negative ethical connotations because it failed to offer any
principle to help decide what the law ought to be.0 6 It also under-
mined the proper notion of professional role.
If the distinguishing characteristic of the lawyer lies in his ability
to predict where, and under what conditions, state power will
strike, he ceases to be a lawyer when he concerns himself with
any other question. This means that if he ventures into ques-
tions of what the law ought to be he leaves behind him the com-
fortable shelter of prestige-filled words like lawyer, professional
competence, jurisprudence, and perhaps even legal philosophy.
He is put strictly on his own with nothing to support him but a
private call and a shaky belief in the validity of his own
insight.
10 7
Fuller believed that law was essentially about the establishment
of a sound framework for social life. The lawyer's task under this view
102. American Legal Philosophy, supra note 52, at 476-77.
103. SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 1, at 264-65.
104. MORALITY, supra note 43, at 145. In this passage Fuller is contrasting his vision of
law with the vision that conceives law as the struggle for power, with the designation going
to the most powerful. In Fuller's view, law must be seen as an attempt to reach the excel-
lences suggested by its substantive and procedural aims. In contrast, the opposing view
studies law "for what it is and does, and not for what it is trying to do or become." Id.
105. SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 1, at 250-51.
106. SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 1, at 257.
107. SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 1, at 251.
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is technical only to a degree. The lawyer was an order-creator.1 0 8 The
ultimate task of a lawyer is to practice in such a way as to collaborate
in establishing a sound social structure:
By the necessities of his profession the lawyer is frequently
called upon to become the architect of social structure. This is
true not only where great affairs of state are involved and consti-
tutions or international treaties are being brought into existence,
but in the most commonplace arrangements, like working out a
contract for a two years' supply of paper towels for the rest
rooms of a chain of service stations. In a sense, every contract,
every testament, every lease-in short, every legal instrument is
a kind of constitution establishing a framework for the future
dealings of the affected parties.'
0 f
Fuller believed that lawyers participated in the construction of
the social order. 110 The lawyer was not simply a means for the indi-
vidual to achieve an end."' The lawyer was also a means by which
society helps establish itself.' The question is not, "What does my
client want?" Rather, the question is, "What is it my client wants that
is consistent with the limits of the adversary system, the law, as well as
society as a whole?" If my client wants to use means or accomplish
goals that are inimical to the establishment of good social order, I
should refuse. More importantly, I should not abandon my client, as I
ride off on my moral high horse. Instead, I should advise my client on
the best means to accomplish the goal which will also further the crea-
tion of a sound social order." 3 Hence, Fuller's interest in alternative
legal forms-private contract, mediation, arbitration, and custom.
108. SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 1, at 267.
109. SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 1, at 264-265.
110. LON L. FULLER, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM IN TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 30, 37
(Harold J. Berman ed., 1961) [hereinafter ADVERSARY SYSTEM] (stating that a lawyer
"plays an essential role in one of the fundamental processes of an ordered community").
111. ADVERSARY SYSTEM, supra note 110, at 37-38 ("At no time is the lawyer a mere
agent of his client.").
112. SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 1, at 277 (arguing that law should maximize freedom
and lawyer's job should not be to "expound the fiat of some sovereign, nor to predict
which way judges will jump, but to search for truth").
113. See, e.g., SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 1, at 261. Fuller stated that legal philosophy
should analyze adjudication by asking the following questions:
What kinds of human relations are best organized and regulated by adjudication,
and what kinds are better left to other organizational procedures, such as negotia-
tion and voluntary settlement, majority vote, or expert managerial authority?
What are the consequences where adjudication is given problems inappropriate
to its capacities, and how can the damage done be minimized? What are the
procedural limitations which adjudication must respect if it is to be effective, not
only in the sense of reaching an apt and intelligent decision, but also in retaining
the respect of the losing party?
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Fuller saw the lawyer as a person especially skilled in devising struc-
tures that solved clients' problems in ways that were consistent with
society's needs.
III. FULLER'S INFLUENCE ON THE ABA's MODEL CODE
A. Introduction
Fuller's influence on the Code of Professional Responsibility can
be seen in the Code's differentiation of duties and aspirations. This
distinction created a conception of the purpose of a professional code
and a moral justification for the lawyer's role. In addition, the Code's
structure emphasized a view of legal practice in which the interests of
the system took precedence over the interests of the client. These ele-
ments moved the Code toward an integrated professional ethics, pro-
vided the moral justification for lawyer work, and suggested a
purposive method of interpreting its provisions.
The American Bar Association adopted its first set of profes-
sional regulations in 1908. These principles, called the Canons of Pro-
fessional Ethics, were broadly stated principles which addressed
matters of civility as well as specific matters of professional regula-
tion." 4 The Canons relied heavily on the 1887 Code of Ethics
adopted by the Alabama Bar Association. This Code relied primarily
on Judge George Sharswood's nineteenth century Canons of Ethics." 5
They authoritatively reflected the conscience of the profession in the
early twentieth century and the latter part of the nineteenth.'1 6 They
were concerned with civility, discussing the "honorable relations be-
tween individuals" and ignoring the responsibility the lawyer had to
society or the legal system." 7 The Canons assumed a world of solo
practitioners in small towns sharing common values." 8 While that
may have reflected life at the beginning of the century, it did not re-
flect the reality of life at mid-century. A federal judge, attempting to
salvage the Canons in 1955, referred to them as
114. See generally CHARLES WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 2.6.2 (1986). For a
discussion of the drafting and adoption of the Canons see HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL
ETHICS 23-25 (1953).
115. HON. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (5th ed. 1993). David Hoff-
man predated Sharswood's efforts. See generally DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL
STUDY (Morris L. Cohen et al. eds., reprinted ed. 1972).
116. Philbrick McCoy, The Canons of Ethics: A Reappraisal by the Organized Bar,
A.B.A. J., Jan. 1957, 38-39.
117. McCoy, supra note 116, at 39.
118. Geoffrey Hazard referred to this as the practice of "downstate Illinois." GEOF-
FREY C. HAZARD, JR., ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 16 (1978) [hereinafter ETHICS].
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your statute law of ethics.., so far as the American Bar Associ-
ation is concerned the conduct of the lawyer is to be measured
by these rules which are down in black and white and which
apply to that conduct just like any statute would apply to any
factual case which you will have in a lawsuit. [These rules] have
been interpreted ... over a period of years just like a court con-
strues and interprets the statutory law.119
B. The Joint Conference Statement
Dissatisfaction with the 1908 Canons of Ethics built over the
years. The ABA appointed several committees to revise the Canons
over a span of 25 years, but nothing ever came of their reports.1 °
Finally, the movement gained some speed with the appointment of the
Joint Committee on Professional Responsibility in 1955. Fuller and
his cochair, John D. Randall, published the committee's report in the
December 1958 ABA Journal.1 21 The report purported to be a "rea-
soned statement of the lawyer's responsibilities, set in the context of
the adversary system.
1 22
From the very beginning we see Fuller's concern for process and
the morality embodied in it. According to the Joint Conference re-
port, ethical discussions with non-lawyers foundered on the rocks of
the adversary system: "Confronted by the layman's charge that he is
nothing but a hired brain and voice, the lawyer often finds it difficult
to convey an insight into the value of the adversary system or an un-
derstanding of the tacit restraints with which it is infused.
123
Just as Fuller pointed out the inner morality of legal systems, he
suggested that a moral understanding of the lawyer's work would only
be possible after one thoroughly understands the inherent morality of
the adversary system.12 4 Within the adversary system, lawyers advo-
cate for their clients because that is the best way to ascertain facts and
119. Panel on Professional Ethics, 9 ARK. L. REV. 294, 295 (1955).
120. Committees reported on the need for changes in the Canons in 1924, 1933, and
1935. The 1924 report suggested the desirability of statements of general principles as
opposed to specific rules but made no further recommendations. Edward L. Wright, The
Code of Professional Responsibility: Its History and Objectives, 24 ARK. L. REV. 1, 3
(1970) [hereinafter History]. The 1933 report called the 1908 Canons "neither comprehen-
sive nor exhaustive" and that a better statement of principles could be formulated. Id. at
3-4. Finally, the 1935 report recommended far reaching revisions so that new members of
the profession could receive proper guidance. Id. at 4.
121. Lon L. Fuller and John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the
Joint Conference, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1958, at 1159 [hereinafter Joint Conference].
122. Joint Conference, supra note 121, at 1159.
123. Joint Conference, supra note 121, at 1159.
124. "Such an understanding is required not only to appreciate the need for an adver-
sary presentation of issues, but also in order to perceive truly the limits of partisan advo-
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resolve some disputes. 125 However, Fuller would not rest his argu-
ment on such instrumental concerns. Fuller concluded his defense of
the adversary system in this way: The advocate's role is an
indispensable part of a larger ordering of affairs. The institution
of advocacy is not a concession to the frailties of human nature,
but an expression of human insight in the design of a social
framework within which man's capacity for impartial judgement
can attain its fullest realization.
12
Lawyers need not apologize for the adversary system or their role
within it. Instead, they should examine more closely the purposes the
system is designed to serve to both better explain those purposes and
to more adequately discern the inherent limits those purposes place
on a lawyer's conduct:
The advocate plays his role well when zeal for his client's cause
promotes a wise and informed decision of the case. He plays his
role badly, and trespasses against the obligations of professional
responsibility, when his desire to win leads him to muddy the
headwaters of decision, when, instead of lending a needed per-
spective to the controversy, he distorts and obscures its true
nature. 27
The Joint Statement also reflects Fuller's Aspiration/Duty dichot-
omy. In the very first paragraph of the report, Fuller notes that "[o]ne
who undertakes the practice of a profession cannot rest content with
the faithful discharge of duties assigned to him by others. His work
must find its direction within a larger frame." '128 The lawyer must not
simply view each task in isolation but rather should see them within
the "enduring ideals of his vocation.'
'129
Fuller describes the profession's standards of conduct in the same
way he describes the minimum standards prescribed by the morality
of duty. The lawyer must not be "content" with only doing his duty.
"[H]e must realize that a letter-bound observance of the Canons is not
cacy must impose on itself ... to remain wholesome and useful." Joint Conference, supra
note 121, at 1160.
125. Joint Conference, supra note 121, at 1160-61.
126. Joint Conference, supra note 121, at 1161. Fuller once commented in a similar
vein that angels need law, too. "[I]n order to discharge their celestial functions effectively,
angels need 'made' rules, rules brought into existence by some explicit decision." MORAL-
Im, supra note 43, at 55-56. This is so not because angels are "bad," but because there can
be legitimate questions about meaning, interpretation, and application among good peo-
ple. In a world of imperfect drafting, courts perform an essential function by resolving
these questions. Id. at 56.
127. Joint Conference, supra note 121, at 1161.
128. Joint Conference, supra note 121, at 1159.
129. "All that he does must evidence a dedication, not merely to a specific assignment,
but to the enduring ideals of his vocation." Joint Conference, supra note 121, at 1159.
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equivalent to the practice of professional responsibility. ' 130 Observ-
ing the minimum duties makes it possible for the lawyer to pursue the
"higher ideals" of the profession. Just as one must understand the
adversary system's nature and purposes, a lawyer also should under-
stand the nature of the lawyer's role and the reasons behind the rules
of professional conduct. 131 In this way, the lawyer will be guided to-
ward the lofty purposes the legal system serves within a democratic
society.132 Moreover, as a practical matter, the lawyer will be better
able to understand his or her responsibilities in periods of rapid
change and growth.'
33
C. Drafting the Model Code
The influence of the moral tradition to which the Joint Statement
pointed peaked with the 1969 Model Code of Professional Responsi-
bility.13 Elements of this moral tradition and Fuller's jurisprudence
survived in the first draft of the Model Rules. However, the choice to
discard the aspirational aspects of the Code greatly undercut the effec-
tiveness and intelligibility of the moral tradition. Moreover, the furor
the first draft caused and the subsequent watering down of its most
controversial elements revealed the further weakening of this Fuller-
ian understanding of the practice of law. The complete rejection of
the Code's style and format by the Model Rules represented the vic-
tory of a different conception of law.
After the Joint Statement appeared in the American Bar Associ-
ation Journal, the committee did not meet again. The Joint Statement
seemed to be another in the long line of committee reports recom-
mending change but leading nowhere. In 1964, however, the ABA
appointed a committee to study the Canons and to make recommen-
dations for revising them.' 35 Like the constitutional convention of
1787, the committee quickly concluded that more radical action was
130. Joint Conference, supra note 121, at 1159.
131. Joint Conference, supra note 121, at 1159.
132. "The lawyer who seeks a clear understanding of his duties will be led to reflect on
the special services his profession renders to society and the services it might render if its
full capacities were realized." Joint Conference, supra note 121, at 1159. Cf. American
Legal Philosophy, supra note 52, at 463 (arguing that compliance with rules requires an
understanding of the "reasons why these rules are necessary").
133. Joint Conference, supra note 121, at 1159-60.
134. Cf Robert P. Lawry, The Central Moral Tradition of Lawyering, 19 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 311, 311 (1990) (stating that influence of the Joint Report peaked with the discussion
draft of the ABA Rules of Professional Conduct in 1980).
135. History, supra note 120, at 4. The House of Delegates appointed the committee at
the request of then ABA president Lewis Powell.
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needed-by 1969, a new statement of professional standards was
produced.
Fuller was not appointed to this committee and, so far as I can
tell, did not participate in any of its deliberations. 3 6 The influence of
his thought is obvious, however. Among the reasons for completely
rewriting the Canons was the need to provide guidance to new law-
yers. The Canons impeded this process by failing to recognize the dif-
ference between the "inspirational and the proscriptive."' 37 The
preamble to the Code cites the Joint Statement in three out of thirteen
footnotes. The need for lawyers to understand their role in the adver-
sary system and its role in society is pulled from the Joint State-
ment. 138  Second, although a lawyer's practice may change,
fundamental ethical principles derived from an understanding of the
adversary system will always guide the lawyer.1 39 Third, some of these
fundamental principles are stated in the Code to guide lawyers in spe-
cific situations.
40
Beyond these specific citations, the Preamble reads like a product
of the Joint Statement. Lawyers play a vital role in the maintenance
of a free and democratic society. They must understand their roles
and the systems in which they operate in order to best fulfill their
professional responsibilities. In a final flourish, the drafters write:
136. William Simon states that Fuller drafted the categorical restrictions of the Code
but does not provide any source for this claim. William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in
Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1091 n.23 (1988). Reconstructing the legislative his-
tory of the Code is impossible because the committee intentionally opted not to compile
any record of its deliberation. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Xi (0.
Maru ed.) (1969). Simon may be correct about Fuller's role in the drafting process. Never-
theless, it is not essential to my position to establish Fuller's exact role. I am focusing on
the general structure that the Code adopted and the Rules rejected. I argue that definite
consequences flow from these choices. Whether or not Fuller actually participated in the
drafting does not matter when his influence on the structure is so clear. Whether or not he
wrote any particular provisions, the Code's Fullerian structure was rejected by the Model
Rules only a decade later.
137. History, supra note 120, at 5.
138. "'[Tlhe lawyer stands today in special need of a clear understanding of his obliga-
tions and of the vital connection between these obligations and the role his profession
plays in society."' MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Preamble n.3 (1969)
(quoting Joint Conference, supra note 121, at 1160).
139. "No general statement of the responsibilities of the legal profession can encom-
pass all the situations in which the lawyer may be placed. Each position held by him makes
its own peculiar demands. These demands the lawyer must clarify for himself in the light
of the particular role in which he serves." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIL-
ITY, Preamble n.4 (1969).
140. "Under the conditions of modern practice it is peculiarly necessary that the lawyer
should understand, not merely the established standards of professional conduct, but the
reasons underlying these standards." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
Preamble n.7 (1969).
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The Code of Professional Responsibility points the way to the
aspiring and provides standards by which to judge the transgres-
sor. Each lawyer must find within his own conscience the touch-
stone against which to test the extent to which his actions should
rise above minimum standards [set forth in the Disciplinary
Rules]. But in the last analysis it is the desire for the respect and
confidence of the members of his profession and of the society
which he serves that should provide to a lawyer the incentive for
the highest possible degree of ethical conduct. The possible loss
of that respect and confidence is the ultimate sanction. So long
as its practitioners are guided by these principles, the law will
continue to be a noble profession. This is its greatness and its
strength, which permit of no compromise. 4'
The dual moralities of the law infiltrated the drafters' thinking
and showed up in the actual structure of the Code. The Reporter for
the Code argued that to be successful it must appeal to both the rea-
son and understanding of the lawyer and serve as a basis of disci-
pline. 4 ' The Chair of the committee declared that the new code had
two main purposes: to "aid the lawyer in his search for appreciation
and understanding of the ethics and high principles and dedicated as-
pirations of the profession" and a "statement of the commonly ac-
cepted minimum standard of professional responsibility, in which
sense it is a binding legal code, enforceable by disciplinary action of
the courts."'
1 43
141. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Preamble (1969).
142. See generally John F. Sutton, Jr., Re-evaluation of the Canons of Professional Eth-
ics: A Reviser's Viewpoint, 33 TENN. L. REV. 132 (1966) (noting that many lawyers criti-
cized the earlier version of the code of ethics as an unrealistic collection of pious platitudes
and precatory statement concerning manners and virtue).
143. Edward L. Wright, Study of the Canons of Professional Ethics, 11 CATH. LAW.
323, 325 (1965) [hereinafter Study]. Wright did not follow Fuller completely. Whereas
Fuller did not refer to any objective substantive principles served by law, Wright seemed to
conflate the substantive principles of natural law with the procedural principle so impor-
tant to Fuller. Wright argued:
Truth is objective and does not change with fashions and the times, just as plain
justice is not subject to variables. But the settings in which lawyers practice and
in which courts function are not static. Customs, practices, procedures, traditions
and obligations of lawyers are constantly undergoing transition and these changes
need orderly statement in legal codes.
Edward L. Wright, The Code of Professional Responsibility, 14 ST. Louis U. L.J. 643, 645
(1970).
Fuller was not comfortable with any assertions of absolute truth. See, e.g., LON L.
FULLER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 700-01 (Temp. ed. 1949) [hereinafter
PROBLEMS] (rejecting notions of natural rights, rationalistic, political, economic, and reli-
gious absolutes). This led some to charge Fuller with being a relativist, or at least, with
having relativistic tendencies. See, e.g., Anthony D'Amato, Lon Fuller and Substantive
Natural Law, 26 AM. J. JURIS. 202 (1981) (describing Fuller's view that order, coherence
and clarity have an affinity with morality). But see Moffat, supra note 39, at 190 (stating
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This distinction between aspiration and duty was phrased in the
exact language Fuller used to describe the two moralities of law. As
understood by both Sutton and Wright, this distinction was necessary
to correct the problems of the Canons. On one hand, the Canons did
not adequately describe the ideals of the profession. Thus, they did
not serve an educative function nor did they point out the goals to-
ward which lawyers should aspire. On the other hand, they were writ-
ten at such a high level of generality that they were practically useless
as a basis of discipline. The drafters of the Code wanted to both ele-
vate and police the profession.'" For this reason, they seem to have
adopted Fuller's distinction of Aspirations and Duty.
The drafters structured the Code pursuant to this conception.
Just as Fuller argued that law needed both an ideal toward which peo-
ple could aspire and a floor below which people could not descend,
the Model Code provided both aspirational ideals and disciplinary
minimums. The Code was made up of "three separate but interre-
lated parts: Canons, Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary
Rules."145 The Canons and the Ethical Considerations provided the
aspirational content while the Disciplinary Rules provided the disci-
plinary minimums.
The drafting committee chose this model because of the impor-
tance they placed on the aspirational aspects of legal practice. The
committee considered a number of alternative arrangements, includ-
ing an arrangement that resembled the 1983 Model Rules.'46 The
committee rejected a bare code without aspirational ideals or explana-
tory as "narrow and unsatisfactory." '147 They also rejected a code with
explanatory comment because it "would fail to give practical guidance
towards the true ideals of the profession."' 48 Finally, they rejected the
establishment of official rules for discipline and unofficial ideals for
that Fuller espoused a doctrine of natural law). This much can be said for Fuller: There
were no substantive goals without reference to their social context and structure.
PROBLEMS, supra note, at 700.
144. "The Code of Professional Responsibility points the way to the aspiring and pro-
vides standards by which to judge the transgressor." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY, Preamble (1969).
145. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Preamble (1969).
146. The committee considered revising and updating the Canons. They rejected this
option because too much had changed since 1908 to make the Canons useful without major
surgery. They considered drafting a regulatory code without comment; a code with explan-
atory comment; drafting an official regulatory code and an unofficial set of aspirations. All
of these were rejected by the committee in favor of the three part structure of Canons,
Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules. History, supra note 120, at 6.
147. History, supra note 120, at 6.
148. History, supra note 120, at 6.
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guidance because "the Ethical Considerations were too important and
useful for relegation to an unofficial status.' 1 49 Instead, they decided
to put the Ethical Considerations and the Disciplinary Rules
back-to-back with the particular Canon to which they relate.
This arrangement makes more obvious the nature of each Ca-
non as a general principle, the Ethical Considerations as a state-
ment of the level at which all lawyers should strive to act, and
the Disciplinary Rules as minimum standards derived from the
Ethical Considerations.
1 50
D. The Structure of the Model Code and Fuller's Jurisprudence
Fuller suggested that an aspirational morality provided both the
goal toward which the human enterprise of law should be directed and
the reasons behind specific duties. More specifically, he outlined a
vision of legal practice that reflects this vision. In a Journal of Legal
Education article, Fuller wrote that in spite of the disagreements
about the content of professional regulation some agreement could be
reached on basic principles. The basic principles Fuller was referring
to were that
a lawyer should understand his profession's vital role and pur-
pose in a society governed by a rule of law, the self-regulation
entrusted to his profession for the realization of this role and
purpose, and finally, the standards adopted by his profession,
pursuant to this trust, to enable his services to be performed
more effectively in the public interest. 5'
Fuller declared that the function of professional codes was to
strike a balance between the "general principles of social organization
... [and] an understanding of the peculiar function which the profes-
sion in question performs in the total processes of society."'1 52 A code
must contain a sense of mission and proportion: "A code that at-
tempts to take the whole of right and wrong for its province breaks
down inevitably into a mush of platitudes."' 53 Nevertheless, a profes-
sional code must not exclude completely exhortation:
[A] code would not be complete with a declaration that these
are worthy objectives and an exhortation to work hard to
achieve them. The formulated code should attempt to set forth
in detail those conditions-including social arrangements and
149. History, supra note 120, at 6.
150. History, supra note 120, at 6.
151. Law Schools, supra note 30, at 203.
152. Lon L. Fuller, The Philosophy of Codes of Ethics, 74 ELEc. ENG'G 916, 916 (1955)
[hereinafter Philosophy].
153. Philosophy, supra note 152, at 917.
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standards of individual behavior-that must be respected if
these goals are to be achieved.154
The Model Code's Canons and its Ethical Considerations reflect
Fuller's ideas. The Canons were described as "axiomatic norms, ex-
pressing in general terms the standards of professional conduct ex-
pected of lawyers in their relationships with the public, with the legal
system, and with the legal profession. They embody the general con-
cepts from which the Ethical Considerations and the Disciplinary
Rules are derived. ' 155 They were not enforceable. Rather, they were
something like chapter headings, stating the general principles and or-
ganizing the more specific applications underneath.
156
The Canons provided the teleology for the Model Code. Without
some overall goals set within a social context, law has no meaning.
For example, perfect peace within the community is a worthwhile goal
of social living. Although it may be unattainable, we may still struc-
ture our laws to move us in the direction of that goal. Thus, as an
initial matter, we can prohibit murder. We do not have to know what
a perfectly peaceful community will be like in order to know that out-
lawing murder will help us get there. Further up the ladder, we may
wish to encourage sociable and peaceful conduct not by prohibiting
conduct but by facilitating it. Now we pass from duty, a violation of
which is punished, to something more aspirational. We encourage and
praise such conduct. For example, we know that stable families in sta-
ble neighborhoods are more peaceful than others. So we may adopt
tax, school, or zoning policies that encourage such stability. But
whatever policies we adopt, our goal, our vision of the perfectly
peaceful society, both guides and justifies our actions. In the same
way, the Canons provide this same guidance and justification.
The Code recognized the distinction between punishment and ex-
hortation. A complete code would not omit either enforcement of
minimum duties or the encouragement of high ideals.157 A Code must
tell lawyers "how to practice law in an inspiring, grand manner, and it
should also tell courts and grievance committees the manner in which
law shall never be practiced."' 58 The 1908 Canons were not helpful
154. Philosophy, supra note 152, at 917.
155. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Preliminary Statement (1969).
156. History, supra note 120, at 9 n.23.
157. History, supra note 120, at 10.
158. Sutton, supra note 142, at 137. Professor Sutton was the reporter for the Code's
drafting committee. For his later, revised views, see John F. Sutton, Jr., How Vulnerable is
the Code of Professional Responsibility?, 57 N.C. L. REV. 497 (1979) where Sutton argued
for revision of many of the Code's provisions and for retention of the Code's three part
structure.
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because they failed to make this distinction. The Canons were a mix-
ture of minimal duties and high aspirations, often in the same Ca-
non.'59 Courts and disciplinary authorities were supposed to
discipline conduct on the basis of language that did not separate the
"criminal" from the "religious.' 160 Society does not rely solely on
moral persuasion. Instead, it has criminal statutes that define the min-
imally acceptable conduct for society to function. 16 1
The Model Code's Ethical Considerations and the Canons were
not merely clutter. They were necessary if lawyers were to understand
and fulfill their commitment to the law. The Canons and the Ethical
Considerations provide the moral structure for the lawyer's profes-
sional life. The Canons were the foundation of the lawyer's profes-
sional life and the Ethical Considerations were the moral architecture.
All professional conduct rested on the bedrock of the Canons. At the
same time, the Ethical Considerations buttressed the lawyer's profes-
sional life in the same way that architectural buttresses did. They
made explicit the internal moral structure.
For example, Canon 4 lays down the general principle of confi-
dentiality. The Ethical Considerations develop the reasons why confi-
dentiality is an important feature of the lawyer client relationship.
Both the fiduciary nature of the lawyer client relationship and the
proper functioning of the adversary system require confidentiality.
162
Clients need to completely divulge information and lawyers need this
information to function properly in the legal system. Thus, confidenti-
ality is rooted in the reciprocal needs of the lawyer and the client. The
client needs a lawyer and the lawyer needs the information. Confi-
dentiality serves not only to facilitate "the full development of facts
essential to proper representation of the client but also encourages
laymen to seek early legal assistance." '163
159. See History, supra note 120, at 11 (indicating difficulties in deciphering which por-
tion of a canon is a rule and which portion should be an ethical aspiration).
160. History, supra note 120, at 10.
161. History, supra note 120, at 10. Wright refers to Fuller in this context but, oddly,
he cites to Robert Summers' largely unfavorable review of Fuller's book, The Morality of
Law. See id. at 10 n.26 (citing Robert S. Summers, Book Review, 18 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1
(1965)). Fuller responded to Summers and his other critics in a 1969 revised edition of The
Morality of Law. Summers subsequently recanted and took a more favorable view of
Fuller's position. See Summers, supra note 2, at 436 (stating that his book pays tribute to
Fuller and to all that people miss in Fuller's work).
162. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (1969).
163. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (1969). There is a dan-
ger in looking at parts of the Code in isolation from the whole of Fuller's thought. We run
the risk of atomizing what Fuller always saw as a social task. For example, confidentiality
is important to the "proper" functioning of the adversary system. That proper functioning
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Fuller argued that the lawyer must be faithful to the ideals of the
legal system. The Canons and the Ethical Considerations are explicit
as to what principles and attitudes the lawyer must be committed. Ca-
non 9 enjoins lawyers to avoid even the appearance of impropriety.
164
The Ethical Considerations explain that lawyers must promote confi-
dence in the system of justice. 165 This confidence can be eroded when
lawyers conduct themselves improperly or irresponsibly.166 Whenever
a lawyer is in doubt about the ethical propriety of an action, the law-
yer "should determine his conduct by acting in a manner that pro-
motes public confidence in the integrity and efficiency of the legal
system and the legal profession. ' 167 In the end, the "lawyer owes a
solemn duty to uphold the integrity and honor of his profession.
168
In addition, the Canons and Ethical Considerations provide the
background against which the Disciplinary Rules achieve meaning.
Fuller felt there was a middle ground between pure logical deduction
and pure empiricism.'
69
There is, I submit, a third area of rational discourse, not em-
braced by empirical fact or logical implication. This is the area
where men seek to trace out and articulate the implications of
shared purposes. The intellectual activity that takes place in this
area resembles logical deduction, but it also differs in important
respects from it. In logical deduction, the greater the clarity of
the premise, the more secure will be the deduction. In the pro-
cess I have in mind the discussion often proceeds most helpfully
when the purposes, which serve as 'premises' or starting points,
are stated generally and are held in intellectual contact with
other related or competing purposes. The end result is not a
mere demonstration of what follows from a given purpose but a
reorganization and clarification of the purposes that constituted
the starting point of enquiry.
170
precludes the lawyer from "muddying the headwaters" of decision. Thus, confidentiality
seems necessary to help the lawyer determine the limits of her representation as much as it
is necessary to help the client avoid danger. Compare MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBLITY EC 7-8 (1969) (stating lawyer may withdraw from non-adjudicatory mat-
ter when client pursues legal but undesirable action) with EC 7-10 (stating lawyer may ask
client to forego legal but morally unjust action) and EC 7-25 (stating lawyer should not
verify inaccurate pleadings, make statements about the evidence unless facts supported by
admissible evidence, not harass or embarrass a witness, and not use trickery to put inad-
missible evidence before the jury).
164. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 9 (1969).
165. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 9-1 (1969),
166. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 9-2 (1969).
167. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 9-2 (1969).
168. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 9-6 (1969).
169. Forms and Limits, supra note 59, at 380-81.
170. Forms and Limits, supra note 59, at 381.
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It is not a formal process of finding the "law" nor is it the political
process of imposing the strongest's will. Rather, it is a form of ration-
ality in which means and ends, Word and Deed, combine. 171 It re-
quires, in the end, the exercise of human reason and judgment.
172
This could be a description of the process of interpreting the
Code's provisions in new and unanticipated situations. The Canons
and the Ethical Considerations are held in contact with the minimally
stated Disciplinary Rules. It accepts that there will be multiple and
sometimes conflicting purposes for lawyering. Nevertheless, it avoids
the temptation to oversimplify legal ethics. Lawyers, in fidelity to the
legal system and the goals outlined in the Code, will be able to reach
acceptable conclusions when confronted with a new and unanticipated
situations. These cannot be prescribed in advance. Rather, the rules
must be developed on a case-by-case basis, as it were, in the fashion of
the legal system itself.
For Fuller, the specific goals of a social group also generated the
specific moral principles embodied in their legal processes. The Ethi-
cal Considerations served this purpose in the Code. They "represent
the objectives toward which every member of the profession should
strive. They constitute a body of principles upon which the lawyer can
rely for guidance in many situations.' 1 73 Although aspirational in
character, they are more specific than the Canons. They are analo-
gous to the special rules that parties may come up with to govern their
business relations. They reflect in some specific way the more general
societal principles which they uphold. But they are applicable to a
more specific context. At the same time they are not so specific as to
lose their utility. They are capable of guiding conduct by the same
kind of actors in different situations. Thus, while two parties may de-
cide that a certain arbitration proceeding is appropriate for their deal-
ings, the general principles that suggest arbitration as useful will also
be applicable to other similar business dealings even if the specific
kind of arbitration is not.
174
The Disciplinary Rules are the floor below which lawyers may
not go. They represent the minimum standards of conduct. The rules,
like Fullerian duties, are minimal and prohibitory. They do not ex-
haust the moral possibilities, however. Lawyers who simply comply
with the bare minimum of the rules are "ethical lawyer[s] only in a
171. ANATOMY, supra note 49, at 6.
172. ANATOMY, supra note 49, at 40.
173. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Prelim. Stat. (1969).
174. See generally Mediation, supra note 65 (discussing the diverse application of the
theoretical inspiration behind mediation).
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marginal sense."'1 75 The rules should be fairly enforced "but a lawyer,
to be deserving of the approbation of his fellow man, must conform to
higher standards than those set forth in the Rules."'
1 7 6
This distinction served two purposes. First, these minimums
make it possible for lawyers to pursue the lofty ideals of the profes-
sion stated in the Canons and the Ethical Considerations. The Canons
and Ethical Considerations help define the specific meaning and ap-
plication of the Disciplinary Rules. 1 77 The rules are the basis for disci-
pline and should be applied uniformly to all lawyers, echoing Fuller's
discussion of the inherent tension within the notion of justice between
dispensation and application. 78 Second, they establish a norm of reci-
procity so that lawyers know that others are also adhering to the same
minimum standards. In this way, they make the social organization of
the legal profession possible. Lawyers are called to aspire to achieve
their best and to achieve the best the law can be. At the same time,
they are informed of the conduct that will bring punishment and
condemnation.
Fuller believed that sufficiently motivated people would try to
reach their potential. Similarly, a lawyer sufficiently dedicated to the
principles of the legal system will naturally act so as to serve those
principles. This has the dual effect of creating excellence in both the
lawyer and the legal system. Thus, the Code's structure is designed
for the morally self-reflective lawyer who wishes to achieve excellence
at both the individual and at the institutional level. Compare that to a
statutory model, like the Model Rules. Here the lawyer is expected to
be a diligent rule-follower. The lawyer may, but is not required to, go
beyond the requirements of the stated rule. The location of the line,
that is, where the individual lawyer will draw the moral line, is left to
individual decision. By contrast, Fuller and the Code both recognize
that drawing the line will be difficult and somewhat personal but, nev-
ertheless, a social decision.' 79 Fuller and the Code believe that the
law can be ascertained, at least dimly, by reference to the goals and
principles which animate the legal system. Thus, the Ethical Consid-
erations provide a way to locate the line. They are like the pointer
175. History, supra note 120, at 11.
176. History, supra note 120, at 11.
177. "An enforcing agency, in applying the Disciplinary Rules, may find interpretive
guidance in the basic principles embodied in the Canons and in the objectives reflected in
the Ethical Considerations." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Prelim.
Stat. (1969).
178. ANATOMY, supra note 49, at 38.
179. SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 1, at 251.
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Fuller used to describe the internal morality of made law. The Ethical
Considerations, by clarifying the "natural law of lawyering," help ex-
cavate the location of the line for the individual lawyer in particular
circumstances.
E. Simon's Critique of Fuller and the Code
Professor William Simon distinguished two approaches to profes-
sional ethics: The "Libertarian Approach" and the "Regulatory Ap-
proach."' 180 Adherents of the libertarian view privilege procedure
over substance and form over purpose. This is illustrated by pleading
the statute of limitations to defeat substantively valid claims and argu-
ing interpretations of rules that defeat their purpose.181 This is op-
posed by a viewpoint known as the "Regulatory Approach." Here the
lawyer facilitates informed resolution of the substantive issues over
procedure. The lawyer here distills and transmits information so as to
"clarify the issues in ways that contribute to a decision on the merits,
not to manipulate information to serve the client's goals. ' 182 Here
purpose is privileged over form. 8 3
The two approaches share a common method of reasoning, how-
ever. Categorical reasoning is the
practice of restrictively specifying the factors that a deci-
sionmaker may consider when she confronts a particular prob-
lem. In the categorical style, a rigid rule dictates a particular
response in the presence of a small number of factors. The deci-
sionmaker has no discretion to consider factors she encounters
that are not specified or to evaluate specified factors in any way
other than that given in the rule."8
Simon asserts that in spite of Fuller's advocacy of a discretionary
style for judicial decisions, he helped draft the "categorical lawyering
norms" of the Model Code.'85 Simon goes on to use part of his article
to criticize arguments he says Fuller made in support of the Code.
Unfortunately, Simon does not provide any citation for either of these
points. Even if these claims are true, Simon misunderstands the pur-
pose of the Model Code's structure and mischaracterizes Fuller's
jurisprudence.
180. Simon, supra note 136, at 1085-87.
181. Simon, supra note 136, at 1085-87.
182. Simon, supra note 136, at 1086.
183. Simon, supra note 136, at 1086.
184. Simon, supra note 136, at 1086.
185. Simon, supra note 136, at 1091 n.23.
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Simon considers the Code's Disciplinary Rules as the most im-
portant feature of the Model Code. As such, they exemplified the
categorical approach he criticizes in his article. In that respect, he is
correct. The Disciplinary Rules are narrow and do indeed limit the
lawyer's discretion. But, like the Model Rules' reformers, Simon
identifies the Disciplinary Rules with the Model Code's entire regula-
tory and professional mission. The Disciplinary Rules, under a Fuller-
ian view, are only the bare minimums needed to establish social order.
They must be stated narrowly out of necessity. This narrowness cre-
ates the necessary reciprocity among lawyers but also preserves a
large area of freedom above the Disciplinary Rules floor for lawyer
discretionary conduct. That discretion is guided, but not directed, by
the Ethical Considerations and, to a lesser degree, the Canons. This
very much resembles the kind of discretionary lawyering that Simon
prefers.1 8 6 Indeed, Simon at one point writes that his discretionary
approach is grounded in the lawyer's commitment to legal values. 8 7
He rejects the distinction between a professional ethic and a personal
ethic.18 8  These are words that Fuller would undoubtedly have
endorsed.
Simon also seems to misunderstand Fuller's jurisprudence. What
emerges is a caricature. For example, he calls Fuller a natural lawyer
but goes on to describe a kind of substantive natural law that Fuller
rejected. 8 9 He raises a number of arguments supposedly advanced by
Fuller in support of the Code, most of which do not sound like
186. Of course, there is still a difference between a focus on substance versus proce-
dure. Simon, as I understand him, would focus more intently on the substantive outcomes.
Nevertheless, Fuller's vision is still not that dissimilar. Fuller rejected rigid distinctions
between substance and procedure and would seem to have allowed at least some consider-
ation of outcome measured by how well it served the social order.
187. Simon, supra note 136, at 1113.
188. Simon, supra note 136, at 1113-14.
189. Simon. supra note 136, at 1115. "[A] 'natural law lawyer' in the style of, say, Lon
Fuller would have to consider whether the decisions of the legislature were so plainly
wrong and the values they affronted so fundamental that the lawyer should disregard the
decisions." Id. The question for Fuller was not the fundamental nature of values. He was
morally pluralistic on that point. Rather the question was whether or not the legislature
grossly violated one or more of his eight "laws of lawmaking." See MORALITY, supra note
43, at 33 (stating that the eight laws of lawmaking are: 1) failure to achieve rules at all; 2)
failure to publicize the rules expected to observe; 3) abuse of retroactive legislation; 4)
failure to make rules understandable; 5) enactment of contradicting rules; 6) rules that
require conduct beyond the powers of the affected party; 7) frequent changes in the rules;
and 8) failure of congruence between the rules as announced and their actual
administration).
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Fuller.1 90 Although a complete discussion of this point is beyond the
scope of this article, one example should suffice to show the difference
between Fuller and Simon's version. Simon claims that Fuller would
have argued in favor of "categorical rules" and against a discretionary
approach by saying that the discretionary approach would danger-
ously increase lawyer power. Fuller, on the other hand, was simply
not concerned with this problem. For Fuller, the legal system already
gave lawyers a great deal of power. The question was its proper use
and distribution. This was done not by micro-managing lawyer con-
duct but properly educating lawyers in the principles of social archi-
tecture. In addition, legal ethics had to provide the material for
lawyers to properly apply these general principles to a broad and un-
anticipated range of circumstances. For Fuller, the power lawyers had
was comparable to the power architects had to build buildings. Both
were devoted to important and necessary social tasks and both were
allowed a great deal of discretion to pursue their legitimate ends.
In the end, it is difficult to focus on Simon's critique of Fuller
because it so little resembles the richness of Fuller's thought. He
places Fuller in a related but still alien theoretical camp and uses lan-
guage that Fuller would not have used. The problem is that Fuller is
neither a natural lawyer nor a positivist, neither libertarian nor regula-
190. Simon, supra note 136, at 1119. For example, in the section where he says he will
refute Fuller's arguments, he cites Fuller once for the proposition that lawyers should not
be responsible for the substantive outcomes. Id. at 1139 n.122. It is not clear, however,
that Fuller would have gone so far. First, Fuller's cited remarks on the subject pertained
mostly to criminal representation. Second, even then, he recognized that the lawyer's obli-
gation was to the process. This required that the lawyer respect both the adversary role
and the integrity of the system. Thus, lawyer advocacy ensured that a decision was "prop-
erly grounded" and "takes account of all the facts and relevant rules." ADVERSARY SYS-
TEM, supra note 110, at 39. At the same time, the lawyer can withdraw when the client
wants to engage in unethical conduct. Id. at 38. Moreover, the lawyer should never "so
abandon himself in advocacy that he loses the power to comprehend sympathetically the
views of those with different interests." Id. at 42. It is true that Fuller sometimes claimed
that a kind of neutrality toward outcomes was important for a proper adversarial presenta-
tion. Nevertheless, he did not make this his exclusive criterion for the justification of the
adversary system. Fuller's thought on this subject is more nuanced, some would say con-
fused, than Simon's representation of it.
Simon does not provide citations for any of the other arguments claimed to be
Fuller's. A detailed discussion of these arguments is beyond the scope of this article. A
few examples will show, I believe, that Simon has Fuller in the wrong camp. For example,
contrary to Simon's assertion, Fuller believed that social morality provided an adequate
basis for making discretionary judgments, particularly in the area of counseling clients.
Fuller believed that a great deal of ethical conduct was discretionary in the sense that no
rule could anticipate the range of its applications in advance. Thus, proper ethical deci-
sions must rest on the mature judgment of lawyers schooled in the purposes of the legal
system in the context of the larger society. See Law Schools, supra note 30, at 203.
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tory, neither categorical nor discretionary. His jurisprudence rejects
and encompasses these kinds of antimonies.
IV. THE MODEL RULES AND THE NEW ORTHODOXY
A. The Problems With the Model Code
The Code reflected some of Fuller's basic insights. Fuller saw a
natural law of particular enterprises. His modest claim was that each
enterprise needed to examine its nature to better understand the rules
it chooses to govern itself. The adversary system was the source of
this natural law for Fuller and the Code's drafters. Fuller, however,
might have gone farther. He recognized that only some lawyers liti-
gated, and even then, only some of the time.'91 Yet the Code only
addressed the lawyer as an advocate. Perhaps the drafters believed
that stating minimum duties were necessary only for litigation. Other
lawyer functions like counseling, negotiation, drafting, and planning,
were too multivariate to be addressed by minimum rules. Fuller cer-
tainly suggested something like this when he warned that placing too
many duties will stifle creativity and spontaneity, qualities he found
necessary for lawyers to be good social architects.192 On the other
hand, this flaw may have resulted from the assumption that the Ca-
nons were substantively sound and simply needed a more modern
statement."'1 93 Nevertheless, this inability to acknowledge the many
roles of the lawyer became a central focus in the effort to revise the
Code.
194
191. See, e.g., Joint Conference, supra note 121, at 1161-62 (discussing the lawyer's role
as a counselor and a designer of social structures). See generally Mediation, supra note 65
(comparing adjudication and mediation). See also Forms and Limits, supra note 59, at 370
(discussing arbitration, mediation, and adjudication).
192. Compare MORALITY, supra note 43, at 42 (discussing the optimum location of the
dividing line between duty and aspiration) with SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 1, at 271-81
(describing the reforms needed in legal education to properly prepare lawyers for recon-
ciling "irreconcilable" conflicts).
193. See Study, supra note 143, at 323.
194. See, e.g., ETHICS, supra note 118, at 7. It is doubtful that the Model Rules do
much better. Although sections acknowledge the counseling function, for example, the
specific rules are vapid or unworkable. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT Rule 2.1 (a lawyer may refer to "non-legal" matters) with MODEL RULES OF PRO-
FESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.2 (setting up an arduous process for "intermediation" among
clients). For a thorough discussion of Rule 2.2, see John S. Dzienkowski, Lawyers as In-
termediaries: The Representation of Multiple Clients in the Modern Legal Profession, 1992
U. ILL. L. REV. 741 (1992).
The section on negotiations was modified beyond recognition so that the rules serve to
validate the adversary function, even when lawyers are not being advocates. For an early
and influential criticism of the proposed negotiation rules, see James J. White, Machiavelli
and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotiation, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 926.
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Fuller's focus on the natural law of legal processes turned the
lawyer's gaze inward. This produced another flaw in the Code. While
bowing in the direction of other legal and social developments, it pro-
ceeded in the end to ignore them. While the drafters proclaimed that
the changed context of modem legal practice required a new state-
ment of the lawyer's ethical responsibilities, the Code seemed not to
recognize this development. The small town solo practitioner still
seemed to be the model on which the Code's provisions were based. 195
Moreover, the Code acknowledged the changing legal structure of
practice but did little to accommodate it. The Code did little to en-
courage pro bono service, restated the soon-to-be unconstitutional re-
strictions on advertising, and only grudgingly accepted the developing
area of third-party payors It was as though the drafters chose to re-
cite a mantra-we are lawyers and we have our own way of doing
things-instead of more deeply analyzing social and legal trends.
Finally, the Code's three part structure proved too confusing for
many lawyers, judges, and disciplinary committees. Some critics
claimed that the Code's structure was irrational and unworkable.1 96
Critics claimed the Disciplinary Rules were too vague to serve as the
basis of discipline while others charged that the Ethical Considera-
tions stated duties that conflicted with the Disciplinary Rules. Some
courts and disciplinary authorities began to enforce the Canons, a de-
velopment clearly not in keeping with the drafters' intent. 197
195. "The typical milieu of practice is no longer a small community of practitioners in a
proportionately small community of potential clientele-downstate Illinois in the 1860's-
but an array of practitioners diffused throughout a metropolis." ETHICS, supra note 118, at
16. For a discussion of the different contexts, styles, and ethics of modem rural law prac-
tice see DONALD D. LANDON, COUNTRY LAWYERS: THE IMPACT OF CONTEXT ON PROFES-
SIONAL PRACTICE (1990).
196. M. Peter Moser, The Model Rules: Is One Format Better than the Other?, A.B.A.
J., Dec. 1981, at 1624, 1625 (stating that the inclusion of Disciplinary Rules under the Ca-
nons creates an "irrational arrangement" and creates needless, time consuming research to
get an answer to an ethical question); L. Ray Patterson, A Preliminary Rationalization of
the Law of Legal Ethics, 57 N.C. L. REV. 521, 529 (1979) (stating the Model Code lacks a
"logical structure"). Of course, this view was not unanimous. See, e.g., Charles Kettlewell,
Keep the Format of the Code of Professional Responsibility, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1981, at 1628
(advocating uniformity within the Code of Professional Responsibility). See also Andrew
L. Kaufman, A Critical First Look at the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, A.B.A. J.,
Sept. 1980, at 1074 (no detailed statement why new rules are needed).
197. Canon 9's language that a "lawyer should avoid even the appearance of impropri-
ety" was a prime example of this anomaly. See ANNOTATED MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 135, at 400-16 for a discussion of Canon 9's use and
misuse. The Model Rules specifically eliminated any reference to the vague impropriety
language. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.9 cmt. 5 (1983). For an
example of a court resurrecting the "Appearance of Impropriety" standard in a jurisdiction
that adopted the Model Rules, see First American Carriers, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 787 S.W.2d
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All of the above flaws in the Code could have been remedied.
They could simply be the result of poor drafting. Moreover, the Code
could have been amended to better reflect the changing legal climate.
Surely, lawyers would understand the evolution of the law's demands.
But the quick demise of the Code suggests that more was going on
than quibbles about words or social trends. In discussing the
problems of understanding the first draft of the Model Rules, James
Lindgren commented that if the drafters of the Model Rules were try-
ing to reduce current law to writing merely to update the Code, then
"not enough has happened in the last decade to turn a supposedly
good Code into an almost completely obsolete Code." '198
Instead, it was a change in the prevailing jurisprudential ortho-
doxy that led to the Code's demise. The post-World War II consensus
that law rested, indeed, that it had to rest, on a normative basis crum-
bled. The idea that law was somehow special died. In its place legal
realism was reborn and positivism got a second look. It is not inaccu-
rate to say that the Model Rules represent the triumph of realism and
positivism over the modest normative claims of Fuller and others.
B. The Different Assumptions of the Model Rules
The foregoing points out how the jurisprudential presuppositions
of the Model Rules differ from the Model Code's. For the drafters of
the Model Rules, the Canons and the Ethical Considerations were
clutter. They were meaningless obstacles to the quick and common
sense resolution of lawyers' professional problems. The positivist con-
ception of the lawyer is technical and individual. Fuller's conception
was purposive and social. The Model Rules produced general state-
ments of categorical rules designed to guide the lawyer in these tech-
nical questions. On the other hand, the Model Code provided goals
and ethical guidelines to inform the lawyer of the range of potential
choices and to facilitate the most socially worthy choice. This con-
forms to Fuller's belief that law cannot be reduced to a pattern or
series of patterns. Law is conducted on a thousand fronts. Lawyers
must attend to a complex social reality.
Morality is external to the Model Rules. The rules are not ethical
teachings and are not meant to be so. They are a body of regulatory
law laying down the rules by which law practice is conducted. The
669 (Ark. 1990) (requiring disqualification of law firm because they were retained to repre-
sent two parties out of the same accident).
198. James Lindgren, The Model Rules: A Forward, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 923,
923-24.
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question they ask is practical: What shall I (the lawyer) do in a partic-
ular circumstance? The answer is, "Follow the rules." How do law-
yers know what the rules require? They will be interpreted and
applied just like statutes by authoritative bodies charged with that re-
sponsibility. The interpretation is the law. Whether or not it is mor-
ally right is a matter of private, and not public, concern.
The Model Rules do not function as a creedal statement of the
lawyers' beliefs. The good lawyer is defined as the person who follows
the rules. Being a good person requires defining and following some
independent and private moral standard. If they conflict, the person
must either compromise his standards or find another profession. The
Model Rules represent the triumph of a new jurisprudential ortho-
doxy which combined realism and positivism.'99 This can be seen in
the Model Rules' conception as the law of lawyering, the rejection of
the Code's three-part structure, and the Rules' disconnection of law
and ethics.
C. Drafting the Model Rules Under the Influence of the New
Orthodoxy
Following World War II, Fuller and others attempted to state a
normative basis for jurisprudence.2"0 Although rejecting Langdellian
formalism, they nevertheless wanted to avoid the nihilism of the radi-
cal realists and the potential amorality of the positivists. In this re-
199. Two scholars described this new orthodoxy in similar ways at about the same time.
Professor Robert S. Summers described the new jurisprudence as "pragmatic instrumental-
ism." Summers, supra note 2, at 433. Summers was an original critic of Fuller. After
rereading Fuller's work, Summers changed his mind. Summers' new thesis is that Fuller's
jurisprudence provides necessary correctives to pragmatic instrumentalism. The dominant
form rejects formalism, sees law as a means to external goals, and is pragmatic in its reli-
ance in its focus on the actual context of things as opposed to their nature. Id. at 435. Like
Summers, I also believe that a weak form of positivism is included in the prevailing juris-
prudence. Id. at 436. Of course, strong positivism has never enjoyed much of a reception
on this side of the Atlantic so, for all practical purposes, the prevailing jurisprudence in-
cludes almost all strands of American positivism. For the view that positivism is the domi-
nant form of American jurisprudence, see RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
(1977).
Roger Cramton also described the new orthodoxy in similar terms and at about the
same point in time. See Cramton, supra note 2, at 252 (concluding that the prevalent or-
thodoxy of legal education is a mix of legal positivism, social jurisprudence, legal realism,
and the functional approach).
200. See MINDA, supra note 34, at 24-61. Professor Minda also quotes Francis Lucey
who argued that legal realism bred totalitarianism. Id. at 278 n.41. See also James Boyle,
Legal Realism and the Social Contract. Fuller's Public Jurisprudence of Form, Private Juris-
prudence of Substance, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 371, 381 (1993) (stating that World War II era
American legal scholars believed that realism undermined the rule of law).
346
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gard, Fuller argued that there was no difference between realism and
positivism.20 The Code represented the high water mark of this anti-
realism/positivism reaction. By 1978, however, Roger Cramton de-
scribed the "prevailing orthodoxy" in anything but normative terms.
Writing about the "Ordinary Religion" of law schools, Cramton listed
the ingredients of contemporary understandings of law:
1. A skeptical attitude toward generalizations;
2. An instrumental approach to law and lawyering;
3. A tough-minded and analytical attitude toward legal tasks
and professional roles; and
4. Faith in reason and the democratic process.
20 2
Cramton concluded that the modern conception of law was a
blend of legal positivism, sociological jurisprudence, legal realism, and
the "functional approach.120 3 This latter approach turned lawyers
into "apologist(s) and technician(s) for established institutions and
things as they are [and] to view change as a form of tinkering rather
than a reexamination of basic premises.
204
All of these factors can be seen in the development of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct. Robert Kutak, the chair of the ABA
Commission assigned to draft the new rules, argued that the rules
needed to be seen as legislation.20 5 Kutak claimed that the commis-
sion took the bifurcated structure of the Code to its next logical step
"by drafting rules that are the legal foundation of good professional
conduct, although not necessarily exhaustive. '2 6 Kutak saw the rules
as stating the "law of lawyering":
201. QUEST, supra note 36, at 47. Whether or not realism and positivism are "contra-
dictory approaches to law," as Minda concludes, the reaction against them was real.
MINDA, supra note 34, at 42. The postwar attempt to state a theory of law as against
realism and positivism is reflected, I believe, in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
202. Cramton, supra note 2, at 248.
203. Cramton, supra note 2, at 252.
204. Cramton, supra note 2, at 254.
205. Robert J. Kutak, The Next Step in Legal Ethics: Some Observations About the
Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 30 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 5 (1980) [hereinaf-
ter Observations].
206. The drafters took the "underlying structural thrust of the Code of Professional
Responsibility-its bifurcation of disciplinary rules and ethical considerations-to its next
logical step by drafting rules that are the legal foundation of good professional conduct,
although not necessarily exhaustive. The effort is to state the necessary, but not the entire,
content of ethical lawyer behavior." Robert J. Kutak, Coming: The New Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1980, at 46, 47 [hereinafter New Rules]. One won-
ders what Fuller would have called the Code's structural thrust to "bifurcate" ethics and
law. Fuller's jurisprudence insisted that there could not be sharp distinctions between
means and ends, law and ethics, and the like. Fuller most likely would not have under-
stood the Code to separate anything. Rather, Fuller would have seen the Code as more
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The law of lawyering ... is a body of regulatory law as distinct,
real and compelling as the law of agency contracts .... [T]he
commission was not discussing a mere revision of a list of ethical
do's and don'ts for lawyers, but rather was responding to a sig-
nificant development.., in the law of lawyering.... The Model
Rules do not constitute a new code of ethics but instead, con-
cern the law of lawyering.
20 7
The Rules should be seen as a piece of legislation. Like all legis-
lation, they only dimly reflect morality and ethics. Instead, they re-
flect the ways lawyers practice and therefore provide the general
principles by which lawyers can structure their daily activities.
Severing the link between aspiration and enforcement was delib-
erate. The Model Rules clearly intended to sever the connection be-
tween law and ethics.
[The] change is neither stylistic nor fortuitous. It represents a
considered decision about the nature of professional standards.
As a whole, the Model Rules deliberately eschew references to
ethics; they are at least in form more a set of detailed require-
ments for a regulated industry than a set of ethical principles. 20 8
The first reporter for the Rules declared that the "time has come
to renounce completely the fiction that ethical problems for lawyers
are matters of ethics rather than law."'20 9 The Model Code presented
a confusing picture to lawyers who were not sure if the Code stated
rules of ethics or rules of law.210 This threatened the lawyer's auton-
omy.21' At the same time, lawyers given the discretion to be ethical
clearly integrating the dependent relationships of aspirations and duties. See Teachout,
supra note 42, at 1076.
For the view that the Model Rules represent a "third level" code see Nancy J. Moore,
The Usefulness of Ethical Codes, 1989 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 7, 15 (1990). Professor Moore
sees this third level as an improvement over "simpler" codes. In her view, aspirational
statements of professionalism are regressions to an earlier, "less mature format." Id. at 17.
207. Robert J. Kutak, The Law of Lawyering, 22 WASHBURN L.J. 413, 413 (1983)
[hereinafter Lawyering].
208. Murray L. Schwartz, The Death and Regeneration of Ethics, 1980 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 953, 953.
209. L. Ray Patterson, Wanted: A New Code of Professional Responsibility, 63 A.B.A.
J., May 1977, at 639.
210. Id.
211. "To treat ethical rules of conduct as legal rules denies [the lawyer] the choice the
former gives, and so constitutes a threat to his exercise of discretion and hence his indepen-
dence and authority." Patterson, supra note 196, at 522. See also American Legal Philoso-
phy, supra note 52, at 463 ("Understanding [of the rules] must be vitalized by an
appreciation of the reasons why these rules are necessary."). Cf. Lon L. Fuller, House of
Intellect, 14 J. LEGAL. EDUC. 153, 156 (1961-62) (arguing that a lawyer's autonomy comes
from the lawyers right "to resist the demands of clients that violate the ethics of [his]
profession").
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also had the discretion to be unethical.212 Without rules of law, law-
yers would not act correctly.213 Thus, the Model Code failed because
it did not recognize the proper function of rules of professional con-
duct: "to define more precisely the nature of rights and duties'stated
only generally in rules of positive law. ' 214 Breaking the tie between
professional regulation and ethics was seen as a sign of progress.215
The substitution of rules of law for standards of ethics was the end of
the naive effort to state aspirational professional standards.21
In contrast, the Code asserted the link between ethics and profes-
sional regulation. Indeed, the very structure of the Code demon-
strated the inescapable connection between ethics and a lawyer's
tasks. 217 Kutak claimed that the Code's connection of exhortation and
enforcement was the central problem prompting revision.218 Accord-
ing to Kutak, the Wright Commission "misinterpreted" the evolution
of professional standards. Instead of two parallel sets of rules, what
was emerging was "a body of regulatory law to govern the conduct of
lawyers. '219 The Model Rules attempt to codify the body of regula-
tory law governing lawyers.220 Kutak concluded that "[t]he final draft
of the Model Rules is most of all a legal document. It rests on law and
expresses the interplay of legal concepts. Like any piece of serious
212. "The paradox is that to give the lawyer discretion to be ethical ... is also to give
him the discretion to be unethical. Thus, unless we correlate rules of ethical and legal
conduct for the lawyer, the result will often be less than either." Patterson, supra note 196,
at 522. Cf. Philosophy, supra note 152, at 917 (stating that when professional conduct is
understood as maintaining social order "we are no more free to follow our whims and
impulses of the moment than is an electrical engineer who undertakes to design a circuit
for a specified purpose").
213. Cf. Teaching, supra note 31, at 37 (stating that purposive discipline comes from
within-"Its object is not constraint but freedom. Its sanction is not habit, but insight.").
214. Patterson, supra note 196, at 526-27.
215. Patterson, supra note 196, at 526-27. See also Moore, supra note 206, at 15-17
(viewing this higher level as an improvement over simpler codes).
216. Patterson, supra note 196, at 521: Schwartz, supra note 208, at 959.
217. Patterson's critique suggests that the Code's drafters may not have pursued
Fuller's insights far enough. For example, it is not enough to identify aspirations without
more closely correlating them to the duties imposed. See MORALITY, supra note 43, at 9.
If lawyers were to make legal services available as per Canon 2 of the Model Code, then
the very restrictive Disciplinary Rules under Canon 2 are at best misguided and at worst
hypocritical. Perhaps because the drafters spent so much time on this section, they were
unable to develop the other side of Fuller's ideas on professional conduct-counseling and
private resolutions.
218. Lawyering, supra note 207, at 415.
219. Lawyering, supra note 207, at 416.
220. Observations, supra note 205, at 5.
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legal work, the Model Rules require and deserve careful legal
study."
221
Kutak saw the Rules not simply as a form of law but as a state-
ment of the existing law. The rules were not embodiments of the un-
derlying morality of the legal system and professional practice.
Rather, they were quite simply the recognition of the law as it applied
to lawyers. They were the "command of the sovereign" as it related to
lawyers.2z 2
D. Comparing Fuller and the Model Rules
Geoffrey Hazard, the final Reporter for the Kutak Commission,
asserted that the Code made legal ethics a serious "legal" subject.223
Unfortunately, according to Hazard, the Code failed to realize its
promise because the Code's drafters were either cynical or innocent
about the nature of legal rules.224 Instead of illuminating ethical ques-
tions, the Code's three part structure obfuscated them. The Canons
and the Ethical Considerations narrow the meaning of the black-letter
Disciplinary Rules. They do this by preempting any extensive inter-
pretation that the Disciplinary Rules might be given in penumbral
cases around the black letter rules.2 25
This depresses the rules to the lowest level of meaning that the
literal text admits.22 6 This makes them less than law: they purport to
be rules but they contain anti-contextual provisions and contrary
commentary.227
Hazard's critique joins issue with Fuller's duty/aspiration distinc-
tion. For Fuller, duties should be stated at their lowest level of mean-
ing because they are the bare minimum necessary for social life.
Hence the Disciplinary Rules are largely prohibitory. At the same
time, lawyers dedicated to the ideals of their profession needed to be
given the freedom to aspire to achieve those ideals. Hence, the Ethi-
cal Considerations and the Canons provide the explicit statement of
those ideals.
221. Lawyering, supra note 207, at 413.
222. For discussion of the positivist style in legal ethics as it was found in the Model
Code's Disciplinary Rules, see William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural
Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 29, 39-61.
223. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Rules of Legal Ethics: The Drafting Task, 36 THE REC.
OF THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 77, 85 (1981) [hereinafter Drafting
Task].
224. Drafting Task, supra note 223, at 87.
225. Drafting Task, supra note 223, at 88.
226. Drafting Task, supra note 223, at 89.
227. Drafting Task., supra note 223, at 89-90.
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Hazard rejected this model. The Disciplinary Rules were not the
floor necessary for lawyers to hope to achieve the highest ideals of the
legal profession. They were the "essential corpus" of the Code.22 8
The vaguer and broader Ethical Considerations and Canons only
made it difficult for the diligent lawyer to know how to proceed by
obscuring the interpretation necessary for "penumbral cases."
229
These cases may seldom exist in a Fullerian profession. Fuller
argued that "made rules" were normative propositions projected onto
conduct from some authoritative source. Implicit rules, on the other
hand, arose from conduct and could rarely be captured by verbal for-
mulations. 230  "[M]odern law is continuous with, and fundamentally
dependent upon, informal social practices."23 These social practices
which embody implicit law are brought into being and kept in place by
the purposive effort of the parties to this social interaction and by the
way the parties understand the purposes of others.232 If lawyers suffi-
ciently understand and are devoted to the aspirations of the profes-
sion, then rules can be kept to a minimum. 23 3 If the rules are only the
minimum standard, then most lawyers will obey them and their com-
pliance will not be a matter of interpretation. Instead, like the lawyer
who comes to appreciate his or her role in the quest for truth, the
Code's lawyer will avoid the close calls because the ethos of the im-
plicit rules of the bar, imperfectly stated by the Ethical Considera-
tions, will impel the lawyer toward a higher standard of practice.234
228. ETHICS, supra note 118, at 6. Of course, Fuller did not understand the morality of
duty as any more important than the morality of aspiration. See MORALITY, supra note 43,
at 18-19 (discussing the balance between aspiration and duty).
229. Patterson, supra note 196, at 557: Drafting Task, supra note 223, at 89-90. See also
Theodore J. Schneyer, The Model Rules and Problems of Code Interpretation and Enforce-
ment, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 939, 943 (discussing the problem in a more favorable
light but nevertheless concluding that the three part structure causes unnecessary
confusion).
230. Gerald J. Postema, Implicit Law, 13 LAW & PHIL. 361, 363 (1994).
231. Id. at 362.
232. Id. at 363-64.
233. Schwartz, supra note 208, at 957 (stating that conformity to standards depends on
clarity of standards, homogeneity of group, communications within group, the extent to
which standards are consonant with commonly shared values and positively and negatively
reinforced). Schwartz concludes, however, that these conditions probably never applied to
the American Bar. Id. at 958.
234. "Those who participate in the enterprise of law must acquire a sense of institu-
tional role and give thought to how that role may most effectively be discharged without
transcending its essential restraints. All of these are matters of perception and understand-
ing and need not simply reflect personal predilection or inherited tradition." ANATOMY,
supra note 49, at 116.
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For Hazard, the Code's structure was "disastrous. 2 35 The con-
nection between the regulatory "law of lawyering" and its aspirational
purposes made the Code unintelligible and unreliable.236 Such com-
ments echo the debate between H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller in the
pages of the Harvard Law Review. Hart argued that legal rules have a
core of settled meaning and a penumbra of possible meanings. The
easy cases are those which fall squarely within the settled core. The
hard cases arise when the particular matter falls within the penumbra.
Judges in the first case should only apply the settled meaning of the
law while judges in the second case should choose meaning by making
one or another policy choice about the outcome of the case. 237
Fuller responded with his notion of purposive interpretation.
Fuller noted that there are relatively few easy cases. Instead, many
cases exist in the penumbra. The judge would be unable to even as-
certain this boundary without some knowledge of the purpose that the
legal text aimed to serve. Only in this way would the interpretation of
the law be attached to its moral content. The internal morality of the
law was tied to its effort to achieve its particular purposes. Interpreta-
tion without a consideration of purpose cut law off from its moral
core.
238
Hazard echoed Hart's sentiments. There must be clear, positive
rules of lawyering to guide lawyer decision making. The morality of
the lawyer's actions are an entirely separate matter. Instead, the pri-
mary concern is the diligence with which the lawyer can understand
and then follow the law.239 In a passage that trumpets the disjunction
of duty and aspiration in the Model Rules, Hazard wrote:
[O]n any given subject, the Model Rules provide a black letter
rule and an explanatory comment. The Rules, in other words,
seek to be rules of the lawyer's legal obligations and not expres-
sions of hope as to what a lawyer ought to do.
235. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Legal Ethics: Legal Rules and Professional Aspirations,
30 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 571, 571-72 (1981) [hereinafter Aspirations].
236. Aspirations, supra note 235, at 574 (stating that Model Rules rely on the more
familiar and reliable mode of the Restatements).
237. See generally H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71
HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958) (examining the various interpretations of law between which
judges must select in rendering a decision).
238. See generally Fidelity, supra note 37 (rejecting Professor Hart's theory of statutory
interpretation in favor of a more purposive view).
239. "Very close to the surface in quandary ethics is the presupposition that there is an
essence of morality-that being moral can be reduced to being rule responsible." EDMUND
L. PINCOFFS, QUANDARIES AND VIRTUES: AGAINST REDUCrIVISM IN ETHICS (1986). Cf.
American Legal Philosophy, supra note 52, at 463 (stating that rote knowledge of rules is
insufficient without understanding of rule's purpose).
[Vol. 37:303
THE MODEL CODE AND MODEL RULES
The practicing lawyer needs and is entitled to legal rules
that are not confounded by appeals for moral regeneration....
The law itself-the stuff lawyers work with-defines legal rights
and wrongs.24°
Aspiration should be left for the award ceremonies and to fictional
lawyer stories.241
By following Hazard's lead, the Model Rules settled the debate in
Hart's favor. Compliance with the Model Rules depends on both the
coercive structure of the bar and the presence of the background law.
Thus, not only are the rules identified as law, they are conditioned by
law. The penumbral cases can be decided by the distinctly legal pro-
cess of statutory interpretation. This interpretation proceeds inter-
nally by reference to the text of the rules, the explanatory comments,
and the authoritative interpretations of those rules. It proceeds exter-
nally by reference to that larger body of law that gives context to the
penumbral cases. Thus, principles of agency law, constitutional law,
contract law, and criminal law all can be enlisted in the interpretation
of the rules.242 In some ways, this view suggests that there are correct
answers to the various ethical dilemmas in which lawyers find them-
selves. The answer is found by the correct application of the law to
the facts.243
In contrast, the Code anticipates a more purposive interpretive
process.2 4 The Disciplinary Rules form the floor. Any question
about their application to individual lawyer practices is resolved by
understanding the reasons behind the rules and the goals toward
which they point.245 That lawyers may reach different decisions is im-
240. Aspirations, supra note 235, at 574.
241. Aspirations, supra note 235, at 576.
242. Cf. Patterson, supra note 196, at 526-27 (stating the Code's failure is traced to
inability to recognize that ethical standards are derived from general statements of rights
and duties in positive law).
243. Patterson, supra note 196, at 557 (concluding that most lawyers are probably disci-
plined for violations of substantive law and not for violating independent standard of pro-
fessional conduct).
244. William Simon contends that the instrumental justification for advocacy achieved
formal recognition in the Model Code. Simon, supra note 222, at 61-62. Although there
are many variants of this instrumental approach, at its core lies something Simon calls
"Purposivism." Id. at 62. Simon defines Purposivism by comparing it to Positivism: "In
the Purposivist view, society is populated not by atomistic egoists but by people held to-
gether by shared experiences and norms. The purpose of law is not just to maintain order,
but also to coordinate the actions of citizens so as to further their common purposes as
effectively as possible." Id.
245. Cf. American Legal Philosophy, supra note 52, at 470 ("A Purpose is a fact, but it
is a fact that sets a target; it is a direction-giving fact. . . . [It] is at once a fact and a
standard for judging facts.").
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material. In fact, it is to be expected that reasonable people will re-
solve the various contingencies involved in any given situation in
different ways. The important question is whether or not the decision
points toward the overall purposes of the system.246
The Model Rules also represent a different conception of the
function that rules of conduct perform. Whereas Fuller and the
Model Code understood the minimum rules as necessarily prohibi-
tory, Hazard argued that many legal rules are organic and constitu-
tive.247 Under this view, the Model Rules were a great improvement,
by affirmatively stating lawyer obligations. Of course, Hazard's view
makes sense only if one views the Disciplinary Rules as the "essential
corpus" part of the Code. If they are, then Hazard's critique is cor-
rect. If they are not, then it misses the mark. Hazard sees the Code
through the prism of the prevailing orthodoxy, which is skeptical of
broad statements of principle, views law as instrumental, and takes a
no-nonsense view of legal tasks. Seen from this vantage point, the
Code is misguided and incoherent.248 It fails to clearly state governing
rules for lawyers who need answers to immediate problems. Leading
a good professional life is subsumed in a series of daily judgments
about immediate issues.
24 9
In short, the Model Rules are the progeny of realism and positiv-
ism. The Model Rules separate law from morality. They find talk of
aspirational goals meaningless. The adversary system both defines
and justifies the very law laid out to govern conduct. Ideally, they
provide clear, no-nonsense guidance for lawyers. At worst, they con-
cede that legal theory has nothing to add to our understanding of pro-
fessional roles.
V. EFFECTS ON THE PRACTICE OF LAW
A. Different Forms, Different Moralities
The decision to abandon the three part structure of the Model
Code in favor of the Restatement-like Model Rules resulted from the
246. Cf. Simon, supra note 222, at 63 (stating that Purposivist lawyer "reasons not from
rule to conclusion, but between ends (shared purposes) and means (institutional forms)").
See also Philosophy, supra note 152, at 916 (stating that professional codes require "an
understanding of the peculiar function which the profession in question performs in the
total processes of society").
247. Drafting Task, supra note 223, at 90.
248. Drafting Task, supra note 223, at 93 (describing the Kutak Commission's task as a
"quest for coherence").
249. Cf. Simon, supra note 222, at 39-40 (stating that the Positivist view of society is
that of individuals each pursuing their own ends).
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jurisprudential presuppositions of the drafters and the bar. This much
seems clear. Whether or not this choice makes a practical difference
in lawyers' lives is another matter. Fuller understood that the job of
the legal philosopher is to decide how lawyers may best spend their
professional lives.25 ° In this light, Fuller said the proper way to evalu-
ate a legal philosophy was to ask: "Would the adoption of the one
view or the other affect the way in which the judge, the lawyer, the law
teacher, or the law student spends his working day?12 51 For Fuller,
choosing the most socially useful jurisprudence was an important pro-
fessional matter. He noted in a related context that "working within
the institutional forms of the game generates the moral qualities nec-
essary to make the game playable." '252 Different institutional forms
will lead to different moral qualities:
Surely the man who conceives his task as that of reducing the
relations of men to a reasoned harmony will be a different kind
of lawyer from one who regards his task as that of charting the
behavior sequences of certain elderly state officials. And if the
lawyer shapes himself by his conception of the law, so also, to
the extent of his influence, does he in turn shape the society in
which he lives.... If definitions of law are mere words, they are
words which may significantly direct the application of human
energies .... 
253
Thus, Fuller would agree that the jurisprudence behind the insti-
tutional statements of professional standards will significantly affect
the way lawyers practice law. Accordingly, the adoption of the more
positivistic Model Rules over the more purposive254 Model Code sug-
gests several different ways of viewing the lawyer, the legal system and
the lawyer's role that may effect the way lawyers practice law.
250. QUEST, supra note 36, at 2.
251. QUEST, supra note 36, at 2-3.
252. Irrigation, supra note 17, at 1033.
253. QUEST, supra note 36, at 3-4.
254. Professor Simon defines purposivism as a conception of law that understands
law's purpose is to both maintain order and to coordinate the social actions of individuals
so as to further common aims as much as is possible. Simon, Supra note 222, at 62. He
argues that positivism and purposivism have been the two dominant ideological forms jus-
tifying professional ethics. Id. at 32. Professor Simon properly locates Fuller within the
purposive camp. Id. at 62. Because Professor Simon defines purposivism as an ideal type
which includes the work of multiple purposivists, his withering critique of purposivism does
not entirely apply to Fuller. It is beyond the purpose of this paper to fully engage Simon's
critique by distinguishing Fuller from Simon's ideal of purposivism. Nevertheless, many of
Simon's insights into the implications of purposivism for professional ethics are applicable
to Fuller which I will develop in this section.
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B. Clients' Interests v. System's Interests: The Moral Community
First, a Fullerian jurisprudence emphasizes the system's goals
while a positivistic ethics will emphasize the individual client's
goals.255 This leads directly to a kind of ethics in which lawyers are
not the clients' champions so much as they are the legal system's
champions:
If the primary duty of the lawyer is to the processes, procedures
and institutions of the law, then the lawyer is the client's "cham-
pion" only within that realm and only in ways the laws, social
mores, and moral traditions of lawyering within that realm
allow.256
Richard Posner noted that "[o]nce lawyers could be said to serve
'the law.' Now they serve the client. It is a profound difference."
257
The lawyer is no longer part of a moral community and therefore can
no longer find moral assurance that he is or she is providing morally
efficacious service.258 For Fuller, understanding the true (moral) na-
ture of the adversary system and the lawyer's role within it assured the
lawyer that his or her role was ethically proper. 59 The adversary sys-
tem provided a morally proper and an instrumentally efficient resolu-
tion of social disputes.260 Fuller said that a lawyer did not simply
represent a client. Rather, "[h]e represents a vital interest of society
itself, he plays an essential role in one of the fundamental processes of
an ordered community.21 61 The adversary role allowed lawyers to
255. ADVERSARY SYSTEM, supra note 110, at 37-38 ("At no time is the lawyer a mere
agent of his client."); Simon, supra note 222, at 73 (stating that the purposivist lawyer is not
an extension of the client like the positivist lawyer, but rather, is an "agent of social
welfare").
256. Lawry, supra note 134, at 320-21. Cf Simon, supra note 222, at 66 (asking
whether "the lawyer's membership in the community merely enables him to manipulate it
more effectively; or does it constrain his activities").
257. Posner, supra note 4, at 36.
258. See THOMAS L. SHAFFER & MARY M. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS AND THEIR
COMMUNITIES: ETHICS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1991). Cf. Deborah L. Rhode, Per-
spectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 648 (1985) (stating that more demanding
standards may elevate conduct and deter "free rider"); Rhode, supra note 23, at 709 (1981)
(suggesting that Professional Codes, among other things, clarify moral standards, induce
compliance through peer pressure, and provide an "objective" basis for moral decisions).
259. Schauer, supra note 29, at 304 (explaining that "[j]ust as one method of legitimiz-
ing moral instruction in carpentry school is to make the claim that joinery necessarily in-
volves morality, so too is one way of legitimizing moral instruction to ... lawyers to make
the claim that law, legal positivism notwithstanding, necessarily involves morality").
260. PROBLEMS, supra note 143, at 719 (stating that Nuremberg trials showed that
"process of adjudication can itself be a moral force in men's lives and that this moral force
is not necessarily derived from some other, higher principle, such as established law or
government").
261. ADVERSARY SYSTEM, supra note 110, at 37.
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"preserve the integrity of society itself. It aims at keeping sound and
wholesome the procedures by which society visits its condemnation on
an erring member.
2 62
Kenneth Winston believes Fuller rejected the instrumental view
because:
it turns lawyers into masters of technique without regard to the
ends they serve. Law becomes merely a means to ends that
originate outside itself. It thereby excludes from the scope of
professional competence the idea that lawyers have a duty to
think about what the law ought to be. The separation of means
and ends is contrary to everything Fuller believes about the re-
sponsibilities of professionals-and even contrary to what law-
yers actually do.
263
If, contrary to Fuller, the lawyer's sole task is to champion a cli-
ent's cause, then the only limits are those imposed by the substantive
law and, even then, only if the lawyer gets caught.264 Another mem-
ber of the joint committee, Harry W. Jones, noted the limited moral
vision associated with this jurisprudential viewpoint: "Anyone who is
not a super-Austinian positivist knows that there is much immoral and
unfair commercial and social behavior that can be engaged in without
going beyond the 'bounds of the law."'
265
C. Clients' Interests v. System's Interests: Counseling
A vision of professional conduct that posits the lawyer as cham-
pion of only the client provides little basis for moral counseling.
266
Fuller, like other purposivists, saw counseling as the prototypical law-
yer function.267 Purposivists saw partisan advocacy as legitimate only
in light of the checking function performed by counseling.268 If the
262. ADVERSARY SYSTEM, supra note 110, at 35.
263. Kenneth I. Winston, Legislators and Liberty, 13 LAW & PHIL. 389, 395-96 (1994).
264. Simon, supra note 222, at 65.
265. Harry W. Jones, Lawyers and Justice: The Uneasy Ethics of Partisanship, 23 VILL.
L. REV. 957, 970 (1978). Cf Reed Elizabeth Loder, Moral Truthseeking and the Virtuous
Negotiator, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 45, 86 (1994) ("Lawyers, who are trained to maneuver
around written laws, will not treat their own ethical codes as an exception.") See also
David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism For Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468 (1990). Professor
Wilkins argues that a model of legal ethics constraining lawyers within "the bounds of thee
law" contradicts the realists' claim that law is indeterminate. Id. at 475-76. Although law
appears determinate from the perspective of the practicing lawyer, the ethical codes never-
theless require a great deal of discretionary judgment. Id. at 496-97.
266. For a treatment of several models of client counseling see THOMAS L. SHAFFER &
ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (1994).
267. Simon, supra note 222, at 71.
268. Simon, supra note 222, at 72. See, e.g., Joint Conference, supra note 121, at 1161
(stating that the "most effective realization of the law's aims often takes place in the attor-
SOUTH TEXAS LAW REVIEW
lawyer serves only the client and has no responsibilities to the legal
system, then there is nothing left to say to a client who wishes to do a
perfectly legal but morally troubling action.269 Professor Jones ex-
plained it this way: "The [positivist] lawyer as counselor is answerable
only for the positive legality, and not for the fairness and moral pro-
priety, of what he accomplishes for the clients he serves.
270
A Fullerian would have no concept of the oft-repeated admoni-
tion that lawyers should not impose their own morality on their cli-
ents. Such a client-centered neutrality is incomprehensible inside
Fuller's legal system in which moral values are embodied in the very
processes themselves and in the society these processes create. The
lawyer who refuses to follow a client's directive to engage in combat-
ive, deceptive, but technically "legal" discovery would not be impos-
ing his morality on the client; rather, he or she simply would be
translating the morality of the legal process into the client's case.27'
D. Clients' Interests v. System's Interests: Getting Clients
Removing the focus from the system to the client tends to ob-
scure the traditional distinction between a profession and a business.
If client (consumer) satisfaction is the only goal, then traditional re-
strictions on advertising, solicitation, unauthorized practice, referral
fees, excessive fees, and bar admission seem dubious.272 Without a
jurisprudence that sees the legal system as embodying moral values
ney's office, where litigation is forestalled by anticipating its outcome, where the lawyer's
quiet counsel takes the place of public force").
269. SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 266, at 38 (citing David Luban, Paternalism and
the Legal Profession, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 454, 459 n.9) (arguing that such an approach turns
moral problems into technical problems). Monroe Freedman is the best known proponent
of a style of counseling that tells lawyers to raise moral issues but abide unquestioningly by
the client's decision. See Monroe H. Freedman, Personal Responsibility in a Professional
System, 27 CATH. U. L. REv. 191 (1978). Freedman does not stop here. The morality of
the lawyer's conduct is determined solely by the needs of the client. According to Freed-
man, this justifies allowing the client to testify falsely and covering up the client's crimes
and frauds. MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS (1990). See gen-
erally Reed Elizabeth Loder, Out of Uncertainty: A Model of the Lawyer-Client Relation-
ship, 2 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 89 (1993) (articulating a dialogic model to morally
rehabilitate lawyers' vision of their work).
270. Jones, supra note 265, at 971. See also Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Lim-
its of the Law: An Exercise in the Jurisprudence and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J.
1545, 1554 (1995) (modem lawyer's legal realism may encourage clients not to respect the
law).
271. Joint Conference, supra note 121, at 1161 (saying that the lawyer should lend per-
spective to controversy and not "distort and obscure" process).
272. Compare Posner, supra note 4, at 36 (supporting paralegal practice and competi-
tion from ancillary providers like bankers, accountants, economists, etc.) with Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., et al., Why Lawyers Should be Allowed to Advertise: A Market Analysis of
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(indeed without a jurisprudence that recognizes moral values at all),
there is precious little to be said for restraining the client-seeking ac-
tivities of lawyers in ways different than the business seeking activities
of anyone else.273 If lawyer ethics are coexistent with the "boundaries
of the law," then the only justification for any of the restrictions listed
above rests in the power of the lawyer lobby to enforce its cartel-like
restrictions to guarantee a fixed and high price for the lawyers' ser-
vice.274 If the bar's power collapses completely and the law becomes
largely an unregulated service like business management or re-
tail selling, we can expect a profound change in the reigning
conception of law: a change from the idea of law as an autono-
mous realm of thought to the idea of law as a heterogenous
medley of rhetorical thrusts and parries, of advice and media-
tion by wise elders, of policy analyses and investigations, of mis-
cellaneous clerical and bureaucratic tasks.275
E. Clients' Interests v. System's Interests: The Lawyer's Creed
Fourth, Fuller's ethics describe the "central moral tradition of
lawyering. ' '276 The Canons and the Ethical Considerations form a
kind of confession of faith. Like religious creedal statements, they are
texts to which lawyers can turn to understand, affirm, and reaffirm
their basic commitments. Also, like creedal statements, they form the
basis for specific moral rules, yet they themselves are not formal rules.
Just as a creed tells an adherent what foundational things to believe
while constraining other beliefs and activities, the Canons and Ethical
Considerations tell the lawyer what the system expects them to be-
lieve and suggest limits to their professional behavior. They set the
basis and the boundaries in which a person becomes and remains a
lawyer.
Legal Services, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1084 (1983) [hereinafter Market Analysis] (recognizing
legal services as market commodity leads to conclusion in favor of advertising).
273. See Market Analysis, supra note 272, at 1086 (arguing that anxiety over lawyer
advertising may stem from portrayal of the legal profession as a business, but that ideology
and market forces favor advertising of standardized legal services).
274. Posner, supra note 4, at 1-2.
275. Posner, supra note 4, at 2. I should note that this is a description from someone in
favor of such development. I take no position on the specific kinds of regulations. Rather,
I am only pointing out the consequences of one or another conception. Further, Posner
argues that the practice creates the jurisprudence. I believe the relationship is more com-
plicated. See, e.g, KUHN, supra note 3, at 176 (paradigms define scientific community while
community defines paradigms); MORAL ENQUIRY, supra note 7, at 17 (cannot characterize
data except in terms of prior theoretical commitment).
276. Lawry, supra note 134, at 311.
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In the Joint Statement, Fuller and Randall made this connection
explicitly:
Understanding may enable the lawyer to see the goal toward
which he should strive, but it will not furnish the motive power
that will impel him toward it. For this the lawyer requires a
sense of attachment to something larger than himself .... For
some this will be attainable only through religious faith. For
others it may come from a feeling of identification with the legal
profession and its great leaders of the past.277
F. Clients' Interests v. System's Interests: The Good Lawyer
This creates a particular conception of the "good lawyer." The
good lawyer will not simply follow rules. Rather, the good lawyer
lives her professional life striving to serve the legal system's goals,
shaped and guided by the Canons and the Ethical Considerations.278
The good lawyer here is an autonomous moral agent trusted to fulfill
her basic duties and invested with the freedom to find her own "good-
ness within the law.1
279
For Fuller, the morality of the lawyer's practice must flow from
the reality of the lawyer's beliefs about the law.28 ° The moral quality
of a person's professional life cannot be measured by something exter-
277. Joint Conference, supra note 121, at 1218. See Rob Atkinson, Beyond the New
Role Morality for Lawyer's, 51 MD. L. REV. 853, 978 (1992) (arguing that the "new wine"
of individual moral responsibility must be drunk "sacramentally, in congregations of those
who believe in shared goals, and celebratorily, in symposia whose members are bound
together by their friendship to own another.")
278. Joint Conference, supra note 121, at 1218. Cf Reed Elizabeth Loder, Tighter
Rules of Professional Conduct: Saltwater for Thirst, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL. ETHICS 1311,
1311-12 (1987) (tighter rules may encourage morally deficient behavior, discourage moral
excellence, deter moral deliberation, and personal responsibility).
279. Positivists also can make this claim. They will argue that the moral goodness of
the lawyer is always in question. The rules simply establish the way lawyers play the game.
They are morally neutral. The individual lawyer can always use his own moral calculus to
evaluate the moral quality of the actions to be taken. This is always true but especially so
when the rules themselves give the lawyer significant discretion. The moral quality of the
act is measured by some gauge external to the legal system. Cf Coder, supra note 277, at
332-333 (broader statement of professional ethics might lead to more active moral reflec-
tion and development).
Fuller, on the other hand, insisted on looking at the moral quality of the lawyer's
actions from the perspective of the legal system and the social function it served. Schauer,
supra note 29, at 302 ("If the definition of 'law,' and therefore to Fuller the job description
of lawyer, judge, law teacher, and law student, is prescriptive, then the lawyer or judge who
does not, as part of her job performance try to make the law better is, by definition, not
merely a less good person, but is also a less good lawyer.").
280. Schauer, supra note 29, at 306 (stating that a legal positivist cannot claim to hold
moral beliefs by virtue of her belief in positivism).
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nal to the system in which lawyers operate. 8 Means and ends, law
and morality, public and private did not exist as purely "either-or"
propositions. Instead, they existed in complicated and mutually recip-
rocal relationships. Peter Teachout says on this point:
[Antimonies mysteriously disappear] and just as mysteriously
recombine in the liberating alchemy of his jurisprudence. [This
is not accidental] but a reflection-indeed, a deliberate conse-
quence-of what he took to be his central jurisprudential task:
to free us from the phony oppositions that shackle inherited lan-
guage and thought
8 2
Teachout claims that Fuller has been misread. Instead of search-
ing for some theoretical structure, readers should investigate Fuller as
an ethical writer.283 He suggests looking for instruction in Fuller's
writing at both surface level arguments and from their performance. 28
Fuller's works should be regarded as "ethical performances that col-
lectively give expression to an integrated ethical vision.
'2 5
For Fuller, a life in the law was a calling, a vocation.286 As such, it
constituted who that person was. One could not be a good lawyer and
do bad things.287 One could only be a good person as that person was
defined in the context of the particular legal system. Just as means
and ends exist in a complex and reciprocal relationship, so also does a
person and her vocation as a lawyer. Fuller's account of law links law
and morality in the same way that a lawyer is linked to her practice.
281. Schauer, supra note 29, at 305 ("Nothing about legal positivism, of course, says
anything about the moral views of someone who subscribes to the tenets of positivism.").
282. Teachout, supra note 42, at 1079.
283. Teachout, supra note 42, at 1075.
284. Teachout, supra note 42, at 1075. By this, Teachout means we should bring to bear
on Fuller's work the kinds of questions one might ask about a novel or a play: "we should
seek to discover 'the vision' toward which Fuller's jurisprudence aspires." Id. at 1093. In-
stead of looking for evidence of some grand system, "[w]e should ask about the 'character-
istic mode of his intelligence' as it is was brought to bear upon experience." Id.
285. Teachout, supra note 42, at 1092.
286. "In all of the lay callings-in law, engineering, medicine, and business administra-
tion-we are training men to make a good living for themselves, but we are not, it is said,
doing enough to train them to advance the Good Life for all men." Law Schools, supra
note 30, at 202. For Fuller, this presented a practical problem of how to inculcate this sense
of vocation without ideological indoctrination. Id. Fuller's solution: "return to the So-
cratic conception that men find virtue best, not through faith or exhortation, but through
understanding." Id. at 202-03.
287. Schauer, supra note 29, at 305 (stating that Fuller was "intensely concerned with
morality, and intensely concerned ... with lawyers who would use their lawyerly talents for
immoral purposes, or, more commonly and more importantly, with lawyers who would not
use their lawyerly talent in the service of moral optimization"). Cf Simon, supra note 222,
at 65 ("Purposivism's emphasis on individual responsibility ... raise[s] the question of how
the lawyer can be blameless when he defends conduct for which the client can be
punished.").
SOUTH TEXAS LAW REVEW
The moral justification in the practice of law lies in channeling client
activities into socially useful paths.288 If the only coherent way to in-
terpret a statute is to understand its purpose, so also the only sensible
way to morally justify the practice of law is to understand the pur-
poses of the system in which it is performed.
Fidelity to law requires a devotion to the legal system.2"9 To
Fuller, law alone carried with it the forms that attracted our allegiance
without regard to ends.29 ° This devotion is played out through the
representation of clients. Client representation is the tangible form in
which the internal and the external morality of the law is manifested.
In this conception, client interests are not independent of and para-
mount to the legal system's interests. The client has only those inter-
ests that the system allows. A client has no interest in (or, to put it in
a slightly different jurisprudence, right to) representation that involves
dishonesty, fraud, and illegal activity.291 What I believe distinguishes
Fuller and the Code is that the client has no interest in representation
that distorts the decision making process of the legal system either.
Although Fuller argued that lawyers should not take responsibility for
the substantive outcomes of client representation, this does not mean
that lawyers are free to represent clients without regard for any of the
means chosen or the ends pursued. If legal representation distorts the
legal process, which embodies the morality of the legal system, then
lawyers are bound to decline such representation. Because this could
arise in a multitude of contexts, no single rule will be able to capture
its essence. Instead, lawyers, guided by their fidelity to the system,
must exercise their judgment in the particular cases in which the ques-
tion arises. Here the lawyer, almost priest-like, mediates the revela-
tion of the legal system for the client.
288. Simon, supra note 222, at 71 (stating the lawyer can reconcile obligations to client
and the public by "focusing on the points of congruence between the particular interest of
the client and the general welfare").
289. Carried to an extreme this leads to what Simon calls "The Sanctification of Cere-
mony." Simon, supra note 222, at 91.
290. Jeremy Waldron, Why Law-Efficacy, Freedom, or Fidelity?, 13 LAW & PHIL. 259,
275 (1994).
291. Cf. SHAFFER & SHAFFER, supra note 258, at 15.
The focus on rights-on isolation from moral influence-brings a new assumption
to the law on lawyers. Behavioral influence runs ... from clients to lawyers. ...
Clients want lawyers to do the wrong thing; lawyers act as agents for their clients
and do for their clients things they would never for themselves. That's why, in
1983, we got a new beginning for the law on lawyers. The law on lawyers is now
concerned with whether lawyers are obliged to refuse to do the wrong actions
clients want them to do.
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G. Clients' Interests v. System's Interests: Lawyers as Agents of
Freedom
In the end, the crucial difference between a Fullerian Code and
the Positivist Model Rules rests in their different normative focus.
One of Fuller's enduring contributions was to recast the debate be-
tween natural lawyers and positivists. 292 Instead of asking whether or
not law aimed at some norm, Fuller focused attention on the question:
to which norm should the law be aimed. He offered the choice of
either "the minimal ideal of order (favored by positivists) or the more
demanding ideal of justice (favored by natural lawyers). '293 Fuller
would not construct a false dichotomy, however. Law favored both.
The preeminent condition of human beings was freedom. Both order
and justice were necessary for human freedom. Legal institutions
were the vehicles for freedom in all of its diversity and plurality.294
The lawyer's participation in the creation of these institutions was it-
self a moral good. Winston describes Fuller's justification of the work
of legislators in words that apply equally well to the work of a lawyers:
Law is not a necessary evil but is intimately connected to freedom.
"[T]he special affinity of law to freedom secures the moral importance
of the legislator's role in society.
'295
Lawyers, as the most active participants in legislation, litigation,
and legal counseling were therefore inextricably tied to the morality
of freedom. Because lawyers devise workable social structures in
which citizens' interests can be accommodated, they must simultane-
ously focus on means and ends.2 96 Thus, "their job is not simply to
think about 'What legally can be done' but about 'What should be
done, all things considered.'" 297 This recognition gives intrinsic moral
value to the lawyer's work and provides the model for the highest
aspirations of the legal profession. When lawyers lose this focus and
instead see only the individual client's goals, they quite literally lose
their way.298
292. Winston, supra note 263, at 389.
293. Winston, supra note 263, at 389-90.
294. Winston, supra note 263, at 390-91.
295. Winston, supra note 263, at 391.
296. Winston, supra note 263, at 395-96.
297. Winston, supra note 263, at 396.
298. Winston, supra note 263, at 395-96.
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VI. CONCLUSION: CHOOSING OUR ILLUSIONS
If the way we think about law is an illusion, then we should pick
our illusions with care.299 Fuller's jurisprudence integrates the law-
yer's activities and morality in a way that is not possible under a juris-
prudential regime that separates legal practice and morality. Fuller's
vision, as embodied in the Model Code, calls lawyers to ethical per-
formance, instead of ethical distance. He offers us an integrated juris-
prudence where dichotomies of thought, language, and activity are
exploded. He invites us to consider means and ends, substance and
procedure, individuals and society, law and ethics in a way that blurs
their conventional boundaries.311 The question is whether or not law-
yers should prefer Fuller's illusions to the ones we have been using.
299. Jamie Cassels, Lon Fuller: Liberalism and the Limits of Law, 36 U. TORONTO L.J.
318, 341 (1986).
300. James F. Bresnahan, S.J., Ethical Theory and Professional Responsibility: Possible
Contributions of Religious Ethics to Dialog About Professional Ethics of Attorneys, 37 Ju-
RIST 56, 71 (1977) (comparing Fuller to the theologian Karl Rahner, both of whom rejected
rigid means/ends dichotomies).
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